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ABSTRACT 
The study Oil, Industrialization and Development 
in the GCC countries is a modest attempt to objectively 
study the above aspects in the GCC countries. It analyzes 
the historical and political reasons leading to the 
evolution of GCC. In the 'formation of GCC an element of 
inherent strength isthe recognition and acceptance of 
Arab brotherhood and fraternity by the people in the 
larger contexts of Arab nationhood. Various developments 
resulting in the formation of GCC trace back to 1976 
initiative by Sultan Qaboos to call a meeting of the 
foreign ministers of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman to 
discuss the regional security and defence policy. The 
second attempt, the same year was by Sheikh Jaber al 
Ahmad al Sabah with the proposal for the formation of a 
Gulf union with the_ objective of realizing cooperation in 
all economic, political, educational and informational 
fields. Developments in the area like the deposition of 
the Shah of Iran in 1979; the installation of the 
revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, the invasion 
of Afghanistan in December by the former USSR and the 
outbreak of the war between Iran and Iraq in September 
1980 provoked the formation of the GCC rolling on the 
plans for the past many years. In February 1981, foreign 
ministers of the six countries held a meeting in Riyadh 
and on May 25, 1981, the GCC was created by signing of 
the Charter. 
The Charter of the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf has its provisions fall within 
the confines of Arab League thus avoiding- any Arab 
confrontation to the organization. The Charter says that 
coordination and cooperation within the states serve the 
higher goals of the Arab nation. It is in confirmity with 
the Charter of the League of Arab states. The GCC 
emphasis has always been on economic and social issues. 
The Charter in its objectives clearly mentions 
economics, finance, commerce, etc. but does not mention 
defence and military cooperation. 
The Unified Economic Agreement of the Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf covers the 
framework, mechanisms and principles of coordination, 
harmonization and integration of economic activity in 
the region- The economic cooperation programme is 
sufficiently flexible so as to accomodate any of the 
forms ranging from customs union to full integration. 
There is the doctrine of gradualism in the cooperation and 
it imparts a utilitarian approach to the process of 
coopertion to gain roots and advance efficiently. The 
involvement of the private sector and private capital is 
an extra feature. The plan to cooperate is forceful. The 
coordination of development, cooperation in financial, 
monetary and other activities stimulates from a longing 
to avail the advantages of regional cooperation and 
specialization. The Agreement does not miss the 
geographical realities of the region. The markets and 
production centres are to be augmented with the necessary 
infrastructure and different modes of transportation. 
Macro economic analysis of the cooperation 
suggests that the economic integration and cooperation 
within the GCC envisages a consumerist approach and an 
appeal to commerce and industry which includes the 
private sector. Integration and cooperation within the 
economies shall widen the market. Efforts to make 
combined purchases of foreign-origin commodities and thus 
obtain more favourable prices would be of general 
advantage. The reduction in prices shall provide for 
higher marginal propensity to save (mpsj, thus providing 
for higher savings and as a consequence higher 
investments. The expansion of the market shall expand the 
volume of business and thus higher gross profits and 
higher net profits. The Unified Economic Agreement 
encourages ^oint ventures in both private sector and 
public sector. The main arm of the GCC to promote 
regional development is the Gulf Investment Corporation 
(QIC). The QIC acts as an underwriter and portfolio 
manager. Many joint ventures have taken place and many 
are underway. The limitations to the economic cooperation 
are that almost all the member countries trade in oil and 
petrochemical exports. All of them import industrial and 
consumer items from the industrially advanced countries. 
So there is little scope for interstate trade to a 
sizeable amount. Thus economic integration as envisaged 
in the GCC Charter and Unified Economic Agreement is not 
to be automatically achieved by mere broadening of the 
trade. Here economic integration involves development. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCCj countries have 
a marked position on the world oil map. This is evident 
from the relevant statistics. GCC is blessed with 69.29% 
of crude oil reserves of the Middle East, 59.48% of the 
OPEC and 45.97% of the world. Similarly as regards gas, 
GCC possesses 45.43% of the gas reserves of the Middle 
East, 35.54% of OPEC and 14.31% of the world. As regards 
production, GCC oil production comprises 71.49% of the 
Middle East, 53.84% of the OPEC and 21.97% of the world. 
Therefore GCC is vital to the world oil security. The GCC 
economies generally depend on the extraction and export 
of a single resource viz oil. The GCC oil production 
share is comparatively less in contrast to its share of 
the reserves. But the region is the world's largest 
producer of crude oil. The difference between reserve 
share and production share stems from the policies of the 
old consortium/ but of late reflects the conservation 
decisions of the GCC countries. The high volume of crude 
oil exports from the GCC region is due to a number of 
reasons. It is due to the low production and 
transportation costs. Most of the oil v/ells are close to 
the surface, free flowing, large and in the proximity of 
coastal outlets. Average productivity of oil wells in the 
region is estimated to be 400 times the world average. 
Apart from this there is also the advantage of the 
falling unit costs of transporting oil across the oceans 
as larger and larger super tankers have been brought 
into use. GCC producers are no longer oblivious to the 
risks accumulating fixed income yielding assets in an 
inflationary world. They are, therefore, no longer 
satisfied with their role as uust the residual suppliers 
of the world crude oil requirements. Now they are 
contemplating the creation of an advanced and integrated 
industrial base and the expansion of their sphere of 
control over the transportation, refining, processing 
and marketing of their oil and its derivatives. 
The heavy dependence of these countries on oil 
revenues calls for a coordinated and thoroughly planned 
oil policy. During the early 1980s the GCC oil policy 
actively advocated the cut in oil prices by OPEC 
members and it was successful in its persuasion 
efforts. The GCC cooperation in oil related areas has 
manifested itself in grand designs. One such initiative 
was to build a GCC wide gas grid and the Oatari General 
Petroleum Corporation has taken up the plan to extend 
the grid not only to Iraq, Syria and Jordan, but also 
to the Pacific Rim. The Energy Coordination Committee 
comprising the GCC oil ministers in early 1982 decided 
to produce and market oil on behalf of the member state 
whose oil infrastructure and export potential was 
impaired due to some reason. A strategic oil reserve 
was proposed in order to cope up with such a situation. 
But soon Saudi Arabia and Kuwait built up their own 
floating stockpile for this purpose. By October 1985 
the Coordination Committee amended the decision to a 
forty five day national strategic reserve in each of 
the GCC member states thus accepting and legitimizing 
the Saudi and Kuwaiti actions. The Coordination 
Conunittee has been instrumental in conducting 
discussions/ exchange of information, coordination on 
various matters and commissioning studies. Lately the 
GCC oil poliices have been marked with increasing royal 
involvement. Apart from the above aspects the oil 
scenario in each member country and the changes that 
took place over the time span have been studied. 
A stock of the industrialization in each Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) country has been taken. The 
type of industries which have been established have 
been analyzed. Industrial production and capacities of 
companies have been evaluated. It has been an attempt 
to study the quantum of diversification by way of 
industrialization. It is observed that industriali-
zation is mainly in downstream oil operations except 
for Bahrain where significant other industries do exist 
specially the aluminium smelter. 
The study of the economic development is an 
essay at trying to understand the usage of oil revenues 
in other productive sectors of the economy. The 
developmental task that has been achieved with the 
realization of oil revenues on the economic development 
10 
of the economies. The contribution of various sectors 
to the Gross Domestic Product has been analyzed. It has 
been found that there is a significant discrepancy in 
the contribution of oil sector to the GDP and other 
sectors contribution to the GDP. There is a strong 
presence of the services sector. The diversification of 
the economy is limited and efforts to diversify the 
economy away from oil are required. 
It is suggested that in order to diversify the 
economies the GCC countries may develop various 
processing industries based on imported raw materials 
after taking into account the comparative costs and 
cost effectiveness. The GCC countries may enter into 
joint ventures, financial collaboration and 
participative agriculture with other third world 
countries. Fisheries and tourism may be developed. The 
GCC secretariat may formulate its own rolling five year 
plan taking into account the five year plans and 
budgets of member countries. A very potential area for 
further development is the foreign trade. 
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Today the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf from 
Kuwait in the north to Oman in the south on the shores 
of Arabian sea bedights a perceived identity of 
interests in a regional grouping called as the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). More formally known as 
'Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 
was set up following a series of meetings of foreign 
ministers of the states concerned, culminating in an 
agreement on the basic details of the constitution on 
10 March 1981. The organization was established two and 
a half months later on 25 May 1981 by signing of the 
constitution by the six heads of state at Abu Dhabi. The 
member states of the council are: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman. The GCC 
spans over an area of 25,60,103.2 sq.km. The climate is 
generally arid and hot with most of the area as desert. 
The temperature runs from 43°C to over 50°C in summers. 
In winters the temperature varies from a low of -2.8°C 
in Kuwait to 33°C in Saudi Arabia. The estimated 
population for mid-19 90 of the combined GCC states is 
approximately 2,08,95,229 (see Table 1.1). The region 
lies between latitudes 15° North to 30° North and 
longitudes 35° East to 60° East^. The population 
1. The Economist Atlas; The Shape of the World Today, 
Economist Books, London (U.K.), 1989, p. 69. 
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consists of a considerable number of non-Arab expatriate 
workers. Arabs comprise only 56.1% of the total 
2 population of GCC countries . 
Histo-Politico Frame of Reference; 
Centuries ago, generations of efforts went into 
building great cathedrals: monuments to the soaring 
thought and faith of men. Today, men construct more 
subtle vehicles of progress that seem - to the 
unthinking - to have animation and power of their own. 
The sequels of todays emerging equations and changing 
dynamics are embedded in international groupings and 
regional organizations. The Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) formed by the six monarchies is no ommission to 
the general principle that any alliance or coalition of 
countries should stem from the convergence of interests. 
The GCC countries are favoured with close similarities. 
There is the common language-Arabic, common religion-
Islam, conforming social systems, affluent oil-related 
economies, monarchic form of government, a collective 
culture and shared geography. In the configuration of 
GCC, possibly an element of inherent strength is the 
2. Birks, J.S., "The Demographic Challenge in the Arab 
Gulf", in Pridham, B.R. (ed.) The Arab Gulf and the 
Arab World, Croom Helm, London (U.K.), 1988, p.139. 
recognition and acceptance of Arab brotherhood and 
fraternity by the people in the larger contexts of Arab 
nationhood. 
The desire of these states to come on a common 
platform and the subsequent developments resulting in 
the formation of GCC may be traced back to 1976. In 
1976, on an initiative by Sultan Qaboos of Oman, the 
foreign ministers of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman met in 
Muscat to deliberate on the Omani suggestion to ratify a 
coordinated regional security and defence policy. But 
there was no unanimity among the ministers and the 
meeting was inconclusive. The same year, the second 
endeavour was made by Sheikh Jaber al Ahmad al Sabah, 
the present emir of Kuwait, the then crown prince and 
prime minister. He toured the Gulf countries to discuss 
the joint action to "preserve the region's security and 
stability in the face of political, economic and 
security challenges threatening this stategic area"^. 
Sheikh Jaber formally proposed the establishment of a 
Gulf union as a vehicle for this joint action, with the 
Christie, John, "History and Development of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council: A Brief Overview", in Sandwick, 
John A. (ed.), The Gulf Cooperation Council; 
Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent VJorld, 
Westview Press, Boulder (U.S.A.), 1987, p. 9. 
objective "of realizing cooperation in all economic, 
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political, educational and informational fields" - The 
genesis of GCC lies in the Kuwaiti proposal, though it took 
five more years for the idea to reach fruition, 
"However, Kuwait's exploratory talks with the UAE led to 
the establishment of a joint ministerial council of the 
respective prime ministers of the two countries. The 
consultations with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman 
were fairly successful and all officially endorsed the 
concept of a Gulf union"^. 
The deposition of the Shah of Iran in 1979; the 
installation of the revolutionary regime of Ayatollah 
Khomeini and the invasion of Afghanistan in December by 
the former USSR impelled a threat perception within the 
regimes of the countries on the Arabian peninsula. The 
outbreak of the war between Iran and Iraq in September 
1980 became an added factor to cause apprehension to the 
security. The susceptibility of the Gulf countries was 
wide open and no further provocation was required to the 
conception of Gulf union to rise from nascent stage to a 
composite body. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
In February 1981, foreign ministers of the six 
states conferred in Riyadh and without exception 
concurred on the creation of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) 'designed at promoting cooperation and 
coordination among the member states with the intention 
to present a unified Gulf position on major political, 
economic and social issues\ Soon a GCC charter was 
framed and the basic structure of the Council agreed 
upon. Three months thereafter, on May 25, 1981, the six 
heads of state met in Abu Dhabi and signed the Charter 
and the GCC came into formal existence®. 
The GCC Charter is punctilious. It has been 
carefully drafted so that provisions laid down fall 
within the confines of Arab League thus nipping in bud 
any potential Arab opposition to the new organization. 
The Charter states that GCC is based on the "conviction 
that coordination, cooperation among them serve the 
higher goals of the Arab nation" and it is "in 
conformity with the Charter of the League of Arab states 
which calls for the realization of closer relations and 
7 stronger bonds" . 
6. Charter of the Cooperation Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf, Article 22. 
1. Ibid, Preamble. 
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Whatsoever be the circumstances leading to the 
birth of GCC, it has always emphasized economic and 
social aims from the early days. Also, not withstanding 
the polemics of various analysis on the formation of 
GCC, any indication that a strategic alliance was in the 
making was shunned. The Charter in its objectives 
g 
explicitly mentions economics, finance, commerce, etc. 
but there is no mention at all of defence and military 
cooperation. Hence economic integration rather than 
military unification has been the kernel of the Council. 
Within two weeks from the date of establishment of GCC, 
the Unified Economic Agreement of the Council was 
announced on June 8, 1981. 
The Unified Economic Agreement; 
Though the GCC is not solely an economic 
confederacy alone, it is conceivably the most propitious 
attempt in economic cooperation in the third world in 
modern times. The GCC has smoothly entered into a number 
8. Ibid, Article 4. 
9 10 
of agreements in areas such as defence ' , foreign 
affairs,education and energy. Nevertheless, the Economic 
Agreement has perhaps marked a new epoch in the history 
of GCC. The Economic Agreement is enshrined in a 
comprehensive document which covers the framework, 
mechanisms and principles of coordination, harmonization 
and integration of economic activity in the region. 
FBIS-MEA, 27 January 1982, London (U.K.). 
10. Laura Guazzone, "Gulf Cooperation Council: Security 
Policies", Survival, London (U.K.), Vol. 30, No.2, 
March-April 1988, p. 141. 
The GCC Chiefs of Staff held their first meeting on 
September 20, 1981 in Riyadh during which many of 
the specifics of greater coordination were hammered 
out. 
Following that, the GCC Defence Ministers held their 
first meeting on January 25, 1982 in Riyadh. A 
collective defence strategy was fashioned and $ 30.6 
billion was collected for a combined defence 
expenditure for the remainder of 1982. It was agreed 
in principle to establish a joint command structure, 
to confer GCC wide responsibilities. 
Three distinct sets of actions were agreed to in 
pursuit of common military goals: (i) a coordinated 
arms procurement policy, (ii) the development of a 
GCC military industry and (iii) an improved 
autonomous capacity for military training. 
10 
The Agreement comprises of seven chapters and 28 
articles. The salient features of the Agreement are as 
follows: 
1. a free trade area in the region with no tariffs on 
regional products and a common tariff on 
non-regional outputs; 
2. a pooling of bargaining power when dealing with 
trading partners outside the region; 
3. a common market area in which citizens of the 
Council member countries are free to move, work, 
own, inherit and bequest within each and every 
country of the Council; 
4. a call for harmonization of development plans with 
the aim of complete integration; 
5. a common oil policy and a co-ordinated policy of 
industrialization based on oil resources; 
6. a co-ordinated industrial development policy for the 
region as a whole; 
7. special emphasis on establishing and promoting joint 
projects in all sectors with the aim of tying the 
production chains; 
8. cooperation in the development of local technology 
and the joint acquisition of foreign technology; 
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9. pooling of human resources to prevent harmful 
competition for scarce labour; 
10. linking the regional markets through surface, rail 
road and air transportation networks; 
11. a common legal framework for trade and investment 
in the region; and 
12. a common development aid policy^^. 
The string of economic cooperation is sufficiently 
elastic so as to accomodate any of the forms ranging from 
12 
customs union to full integration . The doctrine of 
gradualism^^ as adopted, imparts a utilitarian approach to 
the process of cooperation to gain roots and advance 
efficiently, trickling down the benefits as may accrue 
over a period of time instead of a superimposed approach. 14 
The involvement of the private sector and private 
capital^^ is an added feature. This would call for peoples 
participation and with the private funds locked in 
investments and business ventures the cooperation 
11. Unified Economic Agreement of the Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. 
12. Ibid, Chapter 3, Article 10 & 13. 
The above two articles speak of economic integration 
but the form has not been discussed. 
13. Ibid, Chapter 1, Article 4(3). 
14. Ibid, Chapter 2, Article 9. 
15. Ibid, Chapter 3, Article 13. 
10 
conceived and sought at governmental level may eventually 
turn out to be a mass cooperation. This may also act as an 
insulator to if any of the divisive forces that surface in 
future. This step would probably provide leverage to the 
concept germinating into an autonomous process that would 
automatically obviate the centrifugal tendencies in the 
long run. 
The plan to cooperate is forceful. The coordina-
tion of development, cooperation in financial, monetary^^ 
and other activities stimulates from a longing to avail 
the advantages of regional cooperation and specialization. 
In this context, the Economic Agreement is fair, 
pragmatic and progressive. The Agreement takes into 
account the geographical realities of the region. 
Therefore, the markets and production centres are to be 
augmented with the necessary infrastructure and different 
modes of transportation^^. Cohesion and regional 
integration can be achieved through consolidation, 
unification of the markets and a common standardized code. 
This reality has been identified in the Agreement. 
Small population base and limited size of the 
economies in GCC have costrained diversification of the 
16. Ibid, Chapter 3 & 6. 
17. Ibid, Chapter 5, Article 19. 
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economies. Oil sector continues to be the lead sector with 
a strong impact over the economy (see Tables 1.2 - 1.7) 
though Bahrain has very modest oil reserves, still it 
depends heavily on this sector by refininy crude, imported 
mainly from Saudi Arabia. Bahrain and Oman are not members 
of OPEC. But with cooperation, the combined GCC countries 
may be able to diversify and derive economies of scale due 
to similar nature of the products. The cumulative strength 
of the GCC countries would also provide a better access to 
the world markets with a higher negotiating and bargaining 
power. 
Since oil is a wastening resource and cannot last 
forever, the GCC coutries face the ringig challenge to 
broadbase and diversify their economies by a sapient 
investment of oil revenues. A careful venturig of the oil 
receipts into other productive sectors would ensure 
economic stability when the oil wells drie up. This 
economic reality has brought the six monarchies on a 
common platform - the Gulf Cooperation Council, to chalk 
out a strategy which is futuristic and forward looking. 
From the data in tables 1.2 to 1.7 we observe 
that the percentage contribution of petroleum to total 
exports is very high. If the above data is organized into 
two periods viz. 1970-80 and 1981-92 then we see that the 
percentage contribution of petroleum in the first period 
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Table 1.2 
Petroleum Export Revenues of Kuwait (1970-1992) 
Petroleum % Change in Petroleum Export 
Export Petroleum Export Revenues 
Year revenues Export Revenues as (in million 
(in million Revenues % of Total US $ 
US $) Exports 
1970 1,596 94.3 1,693 
1971 2,143 + 34.2 96.6 2,219 
1972 2,370 +10.5 93.6 2,531 
1973 3,520 + 48.5 92.2 3,816 
1974 10,394 +195.2 94.8 10,962 
1975 8,424 -18.9 31.7 9,184 
1976 8,953 + 6.2 90.9 9,846 
1977 8,778 -1.9 90.0 9,754 
1978 9,422 + 7.3 90.4 10,427 
1979 16 ,770 +77.9 91.1 18,404 
1980 17,678 + 5.4 89.9 19,663 
1981 13,790 -21.9 86.0 16 ,044 
1982 8,827 -35.9 81.3 10,864 
1983 9,73 6 +10.2 84.6 11,504 
1984 10,740 +10.3 92.4 11,623 
1985 9,820 -8.5 93.6 10,487 
1986 7,360 -25.0 99.7 7,383 
1987 6,911 -6.1 81.6 8,466 
1988 6,392 -7.5 99.8 6,405 
1989 9,306 +45.5 94.7 9,826 
1990 5,536 -40.5 94.8 5,839 
1991 1,400 -74.7 93.3 1,50 0 
1992* 6,220 +344.2 92.6 6,716 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, OPEC, Vienna, 1987, 
pp.5, 6 & 8. 
Ibid, 1991, pp. 5, 6 & 8. 
Ibid, 1992, pp. 5 & 6. 
•Provisional or estimated figures, as of July 13, 19 93. 
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Table 1 .3 
Petroleum Export Revenues of Saudi Arabia (1970-1992) 
Petroleum % Change in Petroleum Export 
Export Petroleum Export Revenues 
Year revenues Export Revenues as (in million 
(in million Revenues % of Total US $ 
US $) Exports 
1970 2,418 _ 99.8 2,424 
1971 3,803 . + 57.2 99.8 3,809 
1972 5,477 +4 4.0 99.7 5,492 
1973 8,956 + 63.5 99.7 8,986 
1974 35,476 +296.1 99.8 35,556 
1975 29,473 -16 .9 99.3 29,683 
1976 38,157 +29 .4 99.7 38,287 
1977 43,308 +13.4 99.6 43,463 
1978 40,332 -6.8 99.2 40 ,665 
1979 62,855 + 55.8 99.1 63,432 
1980 105,813 + 68.3 97.0 109,083 
1981 116,183 + 9.8 96.9 119,876 
1982 75,534 -34.9 95.5 79,077 
1983 42,809 -43.3 93.3 45,862 
1984 34,243 -20.0 91.3 37,522 
1985 24,180 -29.3 88.0 27,481 
1986 18,060 -25.3 89.5 20,185 
1987 20,427 +13.1 88.1 23,199 
1988 20,206 -1.0 82.9 24,377 
1989 24,096 + 19.2 84.9 28,382 
1990 40,128 +66.5 90.3 44,417 
1991 43,656 + 8.7 91.3 47,797 
1992* 47 ,560 + 8 .9 93.6 50,760 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, OPEC, Vienna, 1987, 
pp. 5, 6 & 8. 
Ibid, 1991, pp. 5, 6 & 8 
Ibid, 1992, pp. 5 & 6 
'^Provisional or estimated figures, as of July 13, 1993. 
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Table 1.4 
Petroleum Export Revenues of Bahrain (1970-1992) 
Petroleum % Change in Petroleum Export 
Export Petroleum Export Revenues 
Year revenues Export Revenues as (in million 
(in million Revenues % of Total US $ 
US $) Exports 
1970 164.9 75.7 217.8 
1971 222.3 +34.8 76.3 291.0 
1972 243.1 + 9.3 69.8 347.9 
1973 336.0 + 38.2 69.1 486 .0 
1974 1,092.1 +225.0 . 85.7 1,274.1 
1975 991.8 -9.1 82.3 1,204.3 
1976 1,172.6 + 18.2 77.2 1,518.4 
1977 1,449.3 +23.5 78.4 1,848 .3 
1978 1,528.7 +5.4 79.8 1,914.0 
1979 1,975.0 +29.1 83.4 2,366.5 
1980 3,209.0 +62.4 88.7 3,615.9 
1981 3,881.9 +20.9 89.2 4,347 .3 
1982 3,145.2 -18.9 82.9 3,790.6 
1983 2,586.1 -17.7 80.8 3,200.0 
1984 2,712.2 + 4.8 86.4 3,138.5 
1985 2 ,442.2 -9.9 86.6 2,819.9 
1986 1,968.0 -19 .4 83.7 2,348.8 
1987 1,966.7 -0.1 83.9 2,343.8 
1988* 1,057.4 -46.2 82.2 1,285.3 
1989 - - - 2,831.1 
1990 - - - 3,760.6 
1991 - - - 3,513.0 
1992 — — — 3,417.2 
Source: Computed from International Financial Statistics, Vol. 
XXXI, No. 5, May 1978, IMF, Washington D.C., pp. 76-77 
Ibid, Vol. XXXI, No. 9, September 1978, pp. 56-57. 
Ibid, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2. February 1980, pp. 72-73. 
Ibid, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, March 1980, pp. 72-73. 
Ibid, Vol. XXXIV, No. 9, September 1981, pp. 72-73. 
Ibid, Vol. XLII, No. 1, January 1989, pp. 110-111. 
Ibid, Vol. XLVII, No. 5, May 1994, pp. 100-101. 
*This data is only upto the first month of third quarter or upto 
July. 
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Table 1.5 
Petroleum Export Revenues of Kuwait (1970-1992) 
Petroleum % Change in Petroleum Export 
Export Petroleum Export Revenues 
Year revenues Export Revenues as (in million 
(in million Revenues % of Total US $ 
US $) Exports 
1970 227 _ 95.8 237 
1971 301 + 32.5 96.2 313 
1972 382 + 26.9 96.2 397 
1973 60 0 +57.0 97.2 617 
1974 1,979 +229.8 98.2 2,015 
1975 1,757 -11.2 97.2 1,808 
1976 2,137 + 21.6 96.7 2,209 
1977 1,982 -7.2 99.1 2,000 
1978 2,294 +15.7 96.6 2,375 
1979 3,643 +58.8 95.9 3,797 
1980 5,406 + 48.3 95.3 5,672 
1981 5,350 -1.0 93.9 5,700 
1982 4,108 -23.2 94.6 4,343 
1983 3,110 -24.2 93.0 3,345 
1984 4,386 + 41.0 97.2 4,513 
1985 3,337 -23.9 99.0 3,37 0 
1986 1,720 -48.4 93.0 1,849 
1987 1,829 + 6.3 92.1 1,985 
1988 1,536 -16.0 90.6 1,696 
1989 1,955 +27.2 92.4 2,115 
19 90 2,800 + 43.2 94.6 2,960 
1991 2,187 -21.8 93.5 2,688 
1992* 3,200 + 46.3 95.0 3,366 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, OPEC, Vienna, 1987, 
pp. 5, 6 & 8. 
Ibid, 1991, pp. 5, 6 & 8. 
•Provisional or estimated figures, as of July 13, 19 93. 
15 
Table 1. 6 
Petroleum Export Revenues of UAE (1970--1992) 
Petroleum % Change in Petroleum Export 
Export Petroleum Export Revenues 
Year revenues Export Revenues as (in million 
(in million Revenues % of Total US $ 
US $) Exports 
1970 485 _ 92.7 523 
1971 718 +48.0 85.3 842 
1972 998 +38.9 85.0 1,174 
1973 1,867 + 87.0 86.6 2,15 6 
1974 6,948 +272.0 94.1 7,380 
1975 6,762 -2.6 93.7 7,218 
1976 8,258 + 22.1 92.9 8,891 
1977 9,132 +10.5 90.8 10,062 
1978 8,624 -5.5 87.7 9,832 
1979 12,915 +49.7 87 .3 14,801 
1980 19,558 + 51.4 89.0 21,967 
1981 18,815 -3.7 86.3 21,79 2 
1982 15,337 -18.4 84.2 18,224 
1983 12,235 -20 .2 79.5 15,391 
1984 12 ,978 + 6.0 81.2 15,990 
1985 11,799 -9.0 79.9 14,764 
1986 7,509 -36.3 74.1 10,129 
1987 8,665 +15 .3 67.9 12,765 
1988 7,3 52 -15.1 60.0 12,250 
1989 11,500 +56.4 66.3 17 ,351 
1990 15,690 +36.4 71.4 21,990 
1991 14,765 -5.8 66.9 22 ,070 
1992* 14,490 -1.8 68.6 21,093 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, OPEC, Vienna, 1987, 
pp. 5, 6 & 8, 
Ibid, 1991, pp. 5, 6 & 8. 
Ibid, 1992, pp. 5 & 6. 
'^Provisional or estimated figures, as of July 13, 1993. 
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Table 1.7 
Petroleum Export Revenues of Oman (1970-1992) 
Petroleum % Change in Petroleum Export 
Export Petroleum Export Revenues 
Year revenues Export Revenues as (in million 
(in million Revenues % of Total US $ 
US $) Exports 
1970 196.1 99.5 197.0 
1971 228.3 +16 .4 99.5 229 .3 
1972 229.8 +0.6 99.5 230.9 
1973 331.2 +4 4.1 99.4 332-9 
1974 1,136.0 +242.9 99.8 1,137.2 
1975 1,439.2 +26.6 99.7 1,442.3 
1976 1,5 61.9 +8.5 99.7 1,566.0 
1977 1 ,568 .6 +0 .4 99.7 1,572.9 
1978 1,502.6 -4.2 99.3 1,512.4 
1979 2,105.3 +40.1 99.5 2,115.2 
1980 3,280.5 + 55.8 99.5 3,294.1 
1981 4,402.7 +34 .2 99.3 4,430.2 
1982 4,099.0 -6.8 99.1 4,132.8 
1983 4 ,202.6 + 2.5 99.1 4,237.6 
1984 3,908.2 -7.0 99.0 3,944.7 
1985 4,690.2 +20-0 99.2 4,724-9 
1986 2,469.9 -47.3 98.8 2,498.8 
1987 3,400.2 +37-6 99.0 3,432.5 
1988 2,86 6.0 -15.7 87.6 3,268-9 
1989 - - - 4,067-6 
1990 - - - 5,508.4 
1991 - - - 4,871.2 
1992 — — 
Source: Computed from International Financial Statistics, Vol-
XXXI, No. 9, September 1978, IMF, Washington D.C., 
pp.280-281-
Ibid, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, March 1980, pp. 300-301. 
Tbid, Vol. XXXIV, No. 9, September 1981, pp. 300-301. 
Ibid, Vol. XLII, No. 1, January 1989, pp. 404-405. 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook, IMF, 
Washington D.C. , 1992, pp. 550-551. 
International Financial Statistics, Vol. XLVII, No 
May 1994, pp. 418-419. 
5, 
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for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates and Oman respectively is: 92.31%, 99.33%, 78.76%, 
96.76%, 89.55% and 99.55%. Whereas in the latter period it 
is respectively; 91.20%, 90.46%,84.46%, 94.07%, 73.85% and 
97.6 3%. This implies that the revenues earned by the 
export of oil have reduced by 1.11% for Kuwait, 8.87% for 
Saudi Arabia with the only exception of increase by 5.7% 
for Bahrain. For Qatar, the UAE and Oman respectively the 
reduction is by 2.69%, 15.7% and 1.92%. Using the methods 
of addition and average it emerges that the petroleum 
export revenues in absolute terms have increased except 
for Kuwait due to the highest ever downfall of 40.5% and 
74.7% in 1990 and 1991 (see Table 1.2) on account of Iraq-
Kuwait War. Computations, using the average method for a 
nine year and ten year span from 1981 to 1989 and 1981 to 
1992 excluding the two abnormal war ravaged years of 1990 
and 19 91, it once again emerges even for Kuwait that the 
petroleum export revenues in absolute terms have increased. 
This trend suggests towards a better economic environment 
in five out of the six GCC countries because it means that 
the contribution of non-oil sector has improved. Thus it 
may be inferred that revenues realized from oil have 
unfolded a way to diversification of the economy. 
Parodoxically enough the 5.7% increase in petroleum export 
revenues by Bharain in the latter period in contrast to 
10 
the 1970-80 period also unveils economic diversification, 
the reason bein^ that it points to an increase in the 
refininy capacity of the country. Bahrain unlike the rest 
/ 
of GCC economies has limited oil deposits and consequently 
low oil production. Therefore a sizeable amount of 
petroleum export receipts consist of refined petroleum 
having imported crude laryely from Saudi Arabia. 
For the combined six GCC countries for the period 
1970-80, the petroleum export revenues constitute 92.71% 
of the total export revenues, whereas for the period 
1981-92 these are only 88.6% meaning thereby a reduction 
of 4.1%. This further connotes that on the whole the GCC 
purlin ropes in economic diversification programme. 
A logical and legitimate issue that calls into question is 
the impact of oil prices and revenues on the economies of 
the Gulf. In the forthcoming chapters an attempt shall be 
made to test this hypothesis. 
Macro Economic TVnalysis; 
The sheer essay at earnest cooperation between 
countries is a formidable and notable task which merits 
appreciation, as the hurdles are so often invincible. In 
the early stayes member countries while discussing the aim 
of the GCC highlighted its economic character, but the 
comment by Yacoub Bishara, the outgoing Secretary General 
is noteworthy that economic integration is not a goal in 
10 
itself, but merely a means for the attainment of the final 
18 
objective,... which is the unity of the Gulf" . Thus the 
GCC countries harmonized a firm and stable approach. 
Nonetheless, Bishara has stressed on the existence of the 
GCC as a programme of economic cooperation condensed in 
the statement: "By the end of the 1980's the Gulf will be 
one common market, with all the obligations and privileges 
19 which that step entails" 
The wide extent of the Unified Economic Agreement 
causes an apprehension as to whether the lar^^er economies 
viz Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE will eclipse the 
smaller and less developed as the integration gains 
momentum. An antithesis to the above sentiment that 
germinates is the three larger and richer states shall 
continuously dish out their resources for the welfare and 
developmental activities of the three smaller states in 
their enthusiasm to maintain the big brother role and thus 
ever be at a loss in pure economic terms. But there is an 
evasion to such suspicions in the dexterously drafted 
Economic Agreement, which says: "In the execution of the 
Agreement and determination of the procedures resulting 
therefrom, consideration shall be given to differences in 
18. Bishara, Abdullah Yacoub, "The Gulf Cooperation 
Council: Achievements and Challenges", American-Arab 
Affairs, Washington D.C. (U.S.A.), No. 7, Winter 
1983-84. 
19. Ibid. 
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the levels of development between the member states and 
20 the local development priorities of each" 
It needs to be evaluated whether the GCC will loop 
in a circular process which benefits both the larger and 
smaller states and cements the economic integration or 
dither the process into two groups set at variance. In 
pure economic terms from amongst a host of factors three 
paramount components to be considered are the consumers, 
the market forces i.e. the private sectors and the 
governments. Certainly the endeavours of the GCC to 
standardize various technical regulations or practices in 
commerce and communications, such as the 'Transit System 
Regulations' approved by the Financial and Economic 
Cooperation Committee in June 1982 or the programmes 
comprising the 'Unified Agricultural Policy' are 
beneficial to all including outsiders conducting business 
with the Six. So obviously are arrangements for free 
21 22 movement of citizens within the Six ' 
20. Reference 11, Chapter 7, Article 24. 
21. Twinam, Joseph Wright, 'Reflection on Gulf 
Cooperation with Focus on Bahrain, Qatar and Oman", 
in Sandwick, John A. (ed.). The Gulf Cooperation 
Council; Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent 
World. Westview Press, Boulder (U.S.A.), 1987, p.33. 
22. Text of Memorundums From the GCC on Food Security. 
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Integration and cooperation within the economies 
shall widen the market. Efforts to make combined purchases 
of foreign-origin commodities and thus obtain more 
favourable prices should be of general advantage. Moreover 
producers and distributors shall achieve economies of 
scale resulting in the reduction of costs and so the 
prices would come down enabling the consumer to buy more 
at lower prices. The expansion of the market results in a 
higher volume and so a higher turnover and thus the gross 
profits and net profits increase which are expected to be 
ploughed back in the economy in the form of investments. 
From the consumers point of view the reduction in prices 
provide the consumer with a higher disposable income and a 
higher marginal propensity to save (mps). With the higher 
raps the savings increase and as the savings increase, the 
investment increases in a macro-economic framework. So the 
consumers get better off because they have higher savings 
and the business also finds itself in a better condition 
because there are higher investible funds. It may be said 
that the economic integration and cooperation within the 
GCC envisages a consumerist approach and an appeal to 
commerce and industry which includes the private sectors. 
The third component namely the governments of the 
member states in due course of time shall be compelled by 
10 
market forces to glue to the integration process because 
it tends to take the economy towards a position of 
equilibrium. But there would be an uphill task before the 
government - that of egalitarian economic management. This 
would be of creating sufficient investment channels by 
bridging the causeway to diversification of the economy. 
Economic Interface 
Article 4 of the Unified Economic Agreement 
provides for the assumption of a uniform minimum customs 
tariff so that national goods are shielded from foreign 
competition over a five year span. 
Spade work for enforcing the uniform customs 
tariff was executed by the customs departments of the Six 
countries under the supervision of finance and economic 
ministers in late 1982 and early 1983. The standards 
determined, classified the imports into following three 
groupings: 
(i)tax exempt commodities - applying to food and necessary 
medical, industrial and agricultural supplies. 
(ii) taxed commodities - subject to a minimum tariff of 4% 
(iii) protected commodities - subject to a maximum tariff 
of 20%. 
10 
These tariffs were to be operative from September 
1, 1983. The new tariffs called for a rise in the minimum 
23 
tariffs of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Oman . The 
member states did not all raise their tariffs before the 
deadline of September 1, but were in confirmity by the 
November 1983 summit^"^' ^ ^' ^ ^ - Steps have been taken 
towards standardization of norms and requirements for the 
GCC in various spheres. Subsequent to the November 1982 
summit, a standards committee was formed, where it was 
agreed upon to convert the Saudi Arabian Organization for 
Specifications and Measurements into the Center for 
Unified Measures and Specifications. The center has 
gradually been promulgating uniform standards applicable 
throughout the GCC countries for various categories of 
23. Bahrain's tariffs, which were higher, ranged from 5% 
to 20% except on cigarettes and liquor; Kuwait's 
minimum tariff was 4%; Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE 
and Oman all had lower minimum tariffs. 
24. Whittingham, Ken, "GCC Summit Conference", Middle 
East Executive Reports, London (U.K.), Vol. 6, No. 
11, November 1983, p. 18. 
25. Sandwick, John A., "The GCC: An Update", Middle East 
Executive Reports, London (U.K.), Vol. 7, No. 4, 
April 1984, pp. 14 & 19. 
26. Whittingham, Ken, "GCC Summit to Focus on Defence", 
Middle East Executive Reports, London (U.K.), Vol. 7, 
No. 11, November 1984, p.20. 
10 
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consumer, food and technical items , e.g. uniform motor 
vehicle standards effective from January 1987. 
A common tariffs agreement was signed in 1983 
organizing the imported goods into three categories but it 
did not spell out as to what goods fell under which 
category. In May 1985 the Ministerial Council considered 
recommendations proposed by a special technical committee 
that cement, iron ore, aluminium and asbestos from one 
member country be exempt from all members' tariffs. The 
finance ministers held a meeting in the same month to 
deliberate upon the recommendations for protective tariffs 
to be levied on cement, iron pellets and aluminium. 
Other than trade and tariffs, the Unified Economic 
Agreement pulls together vital economic and business 
activities, incorporating economic development, industry, 
strategic food stocks, different aspects of the oil 
industry, science and technology, transportation, and 
financial, banking and monetary policies. Certainly the 
GCC has repeatedly provided occasions for the discussion 
of above matters. 
27. Ministerial Resolution No. 12 (Ministry of Trade and 
Agriculture), Bahrain Official Gazette, No. 1643, 
1985, Bahrain. 
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Joint Business Ventures: 
The Unified Economic Agreement encourages joint 
•y Q 
ventures in both private sector and public sector . The 
main arm of the GCC to promote regional development is the 
29 30 
Gulf Investment Corporation (QIC) ' . The QIC acts as an 
underwriter and portfolio manager. It is an investment 
bank investing its resources in development projects, 
commodities, securities, currencies and real estate within 
and outside the member states. The QIC was approved by the 
Manama Summit in November 1982. The GIC is a joint stock 
company organized under the laws of Kuwait and 
headquartered in Kuwait. It has an authorized capital of 
$ 2.1 billion, held in equal portions of $ 350 million by 
the member states of which 20% has been paid in. It is 
managed by a board of directors composed of two nominees 
of each shareholding government^^. The Gulf Organization 
for Industrial Consulting (GOIC) established in 1976 
before the formation of GCC and located in Doha is another 
28. Reference 14 & 15. 
29. Decree Law No- 25 of 1982, Bahrain Official Gazette, 
No. 1518, 1982, Bahrain. 
30. Sultani Decree No. 2 of 1983, Oman Official Gazette, 
No. 256, 1983, Oman. 
31. GIC Articles of Association. 
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major regional financial institution. It has a budget of 
US $ 7 million. It is jointly owned by Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and the UAE (with 17% equity by each) and 
Bahrain and Oman (with 7.5% equity by each). The GOIC 
collects information, prepares proposals and evaluates 
projects with a view to avoiding economically undesirable 
32 and duplication of projects 
The maiden voyage towards collective enterprise is 
the Gulf Tire Company in Bahrain. Feasibility studies were 
performed in 1984. The establishment of the company has 
been cleared but the operations are still awaited. The 
authorized capital of the company is US $ 500 million and 
the ownership pattern is as follows 
Saudi Arabia - 35% 
Kuwait - 25% 
UAE - 10% 
Oman - 10% 
Bahrain - 10% 
Qatar - 10% 
The Gulf United Fiberglass Company (GUFC), 
capitalized at US $ 50 million, approved by the GOIC in 
32. Whittingham, Ken, "Where is the GOIC Going?" Middle 
East Executive Reports, London (U.K.), Vol. 5, No.11, 
Nov. 1982, p. 5. 
33. Whittingham, Ken, "GCC: Focus on Joint Projects", 
Middle East Executive Reports, London (U.K.), Vol. 8, 
No. 7, July 1985, p. 12. 
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1982 has been lincensed to operate a plant at Jubail in 
Saudi Arabia. In 1984 the Saudi government granted 70,000 
square meters of land to the company. GUFC is reportedly 
the first joint stock company by the GCC private sector. 
The Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company has been 
established in Bahrain-, with a vibrant involvement of the 
GOIC. Construction of the mill started in 1983 and 
production began from early 1986. Other projects studied 
by GOIC comprise setting up of a petrochemical refinery, a 
float glass project, an acetic acid plant and a petroleum 
coke project. Apart from these a number of studies have 
been executed in the infrastructure sector in order to add 
to the regional economic development. In 1984, the 
unification of telecommunciation rates was discussed and 
implemented on May 1, 1985. A feasibility study has been 
commissioned by the Secretariat of a possible railway link 
34 
between the GCC cities . Establishment of a joint 
airfreight company has been discussed by the GCC finance 
ministers. An oil pipeline to transport crude oil to a 
refinery and a port on the Gulf of Oman has also been 
under study. It has also been proposed that the submarine 
communications cable connecting Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE 
34. Al-Ameri, Abdul Kader B. "Interview on the GCC", 
American-Arab Affairs, Washington D.C. (U.S.A.) No. 
15, Winter 1985-86, pp. 71-74. 
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be extended to Saudi Arabia^^ 
No doubt the trend in the GCC has been to 
foster and promote joint ventures, cooperation and 
coordination rather than competition among the member 
states but the policies do not shut down all competition 
between the member states. An example may be the creation 
and commencement of Emirates Airlines from October 1985 
by the UAE inspite of the ongoing discussions on the 
coordination of rates and schedules of the other three 
Gulf airlines namely: Saudia, Kuwait Airlines and Gulf 
Air. 
Structural Limitations 
The GCC economic structure and resource base is 
such that almost all the member countries trade in all but 
one line of production, i.e., the oil and petrochemical 
exports. All of them import industrial and consumer items 
from the industrially advanced countries. As a result there 
is hardly any scope for interstate trade in the Gulf to a 
35. Angell, Nicholas B. "Impact of the GCC on the 
Developing Legal Systems of the Gulf Countries", in 
Sandwick, John A. (ed.), The Gulf Cooperation Council; 
Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World, 
Westview Press, Boulder (U.S.A.), 1987, p. 139. 
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prodigious extent. Accordingly economic integration as 
embodied in the GCC Charter and the Unified Economic 
Agreement would not be automatically created by sheer 
broadening of the trade unlike the EEC. This entails 
altogether a different approach. The GCC herein realized 
this subtle distinction and deftly started with building 
joint institutions, harmonizing laws and regulations and 
setting up joint venture projects to create a productive 
capacity which would promote integration. Hence 
integration here involved development, which makes 
economic integration more intricate and demanding than in 
the case of the industrialized countries. It emerges that 
the GCC has successfully travelled on the road to economic 
integration. Ultimately the success of GCC economic 
programme will depend upon the consistency and vigour with 
which the cooperation is carried out. 
Political Cooperation 
Even prior to the formation of the GCC, there 
existed cooperation among the six states, which would have 
broadened with the passage of time even without the 
creation of the GCC. But the GCC provides a framework and 
focus for discussions. With the Council meetings at 
regular time intervals important and bitter issues cannot 
10 
be evaded any more. The discussion is with a focus on 
cooperation. 
The short political history of the GCC records the 
submission of the Fahd Plan which encompassed the Arab 
position on Middle East peace at the 1982 Fez summit. The 
GCC was also successful in resolving the longstanding 
tensions between Oman and South Yemen. The GCC made 
efforts also to bring an end to the two Gulf wars. The GCC 
provides a forum specially to the smaller states to voice 
their concerns. The GCC thus sets a stage for 
understanding, problem solving and consultation for its 
members. 
The quiddity of the GCC cooperation is the spirit. 
It is the spirit of purpose and unity. It is the 
confidence that together they are more secure and command 
a greater influence in the world. It is a message to the 
world at large that they are stronger and stand united. 
The Council has its pertinence and relevance in the 
context of Arab economies. It is imprescriptible. 
Plan of the Study; 
The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter_I 
is an indepth study and analysis of the GCC economic 
cooperation. This chapter studies the reasons leading to 
the birth of the GCC. The documents namely the GCC Charter 
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and the Unified Economic Agreement have been minutely 
studied, interpreted and analyzed. The impact of oil 
revenues on the economies of the GCC countries has been 
assessed. Macroeconomic analysis has been carried out with 
regard to cooperation and constraints have been underlined. 
The essence of GCC in more than ever inter-connected world 
has been attempted. 
Chapter II, studies the oil in the GCC, the 
challenges posed to the GCC due to the depleting nature af 
oil. It also analyzes the GCC oil policy and further 
scrutinizes the oil and gas scene in each member state. 
Chapter III, takes a stock of the industries in 
GCC countries. It studies the industrialization process, 
registers the type of industries and attempts to watch the 
diversification if any. 
Chapter IV, tries to study the employment of oil 
revenues in the economic development process of the GCC 
economies. It also aims to take into account the changes 
brought about in the economic edifice of the economies with 
the fuelling of the oil wealth. It inspects the 
contribution of different sectors to the GDP over the time 
period. The relationship between oil prices, revenues and 
their impact on the economies has also been studied. 
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Finally chapter V summarizes the main findings of 
the study and draws ma3or conclusions for initiating 
prograrmmes of development. It highlights the importance 
of oil, argues for the furtherance of downstream oil 
activities and diversification of the economy. Areas for 
development have been underlined and changes in planning 
have been suggested. 
Limitations of the study; 
The study concentrates on diverse aspects of oil 
which is the principal stimulator of economic activities 
in the GCC countries. Owing to the non-availability of 
comparable statistics, each member country of the 
organization has been treated separately. This to a 
certain extent has limited the analysis in terms of GCC as 
one unit. Further, the study relies on the sources 
available in english language. It is, however, important 
to mention that substantial work has been undertaken in 
english language only. Owing to the financial limitations, 
a trip to the region which would have provided greater 
access to the literature, could not be undertaken. 
However, intensive efforts were made to locate all 
available literature in India. Besides the publications of 
the GCC Secretariat were also obtained through 
correspondence. 
10 
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The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have a 
conspicuous position on the world oil map. This is apparent 
from the relevant statistics. GCC is blessed with 69.29% of 
crude oil reserves of the Middle East, 59.48% of the OPEC 
and 45.97% of the world (see Table 2.2). Similarly as 
regards gas GCC possesses 45.43% of the gas reserves of the 
Middle East, 35.54% of OPEC and 14.31% of the world (see 
Table 2.3). As regards production, GCC oil production 
comprises 71.49% of the Middle East, 53.84% of the OPEC 
and 21.97% of the world (see Table 2.5). Therefore GCC is 
vital to the world oil security. 
The GCC economies barring Bahrain partake primarily 
oil which is a wastening resource. The economies rest on the 
extraction and export of a single resource viz oil. The 
depleting nature of the resource is a cause of common 
concern for all the member countries. The GCC oil 
production share is comparatively less in contrast to its 
share of the reserves. Nevertheless, the region is the 
world's largest producer of crude oil. In 1993 the GCC oil 
production was 13,100.9 thousand b/d (see Table 2.4) i.e. 
21.97% of the world. The difference between reserve share 
and production share stems from the policies of the old 
consortium, but of late reflects the conservation decisions 
of the GCC countries. 
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Saudi Arabia is the biggest producer in the 
region and has the highest reserves in the world. In 1993, 
Saudi production of 7/981.3 thousand b/d (see Table 2.4) 
constituted 60.92% of the total GCC production (see 
Table 2.5), and proven Saudi reserves were 25,87,0,3000 
thousand billion barrels (see Table 2.1) i.e. 56.32% of 
the total GCC reserves. The smallest producer is Bahrain 
with 36 thousand b/d production (see Table 2.4), it also 
has the lowest reserves of 69,584 thousand bbl (see Table 
2.1) i.e. a mere 0.01% of the GCC. Most of the Bahrain's 
crude oil production is diverted to the local refinery. 
However, in the GCC as a whole, most of the crude oil 
produced is exported, and the region thus accounts for the 
major part of world trade in crude oil^. 
The high volume of crude oil exports from the GCC 
region is due to a number of reasons. It is due to the low 
production and the transportation costs. Most of the oil 
wells are close to the surface, free flowig, large and in 
the proximity of coastal outlets. Average productivity of 
oil wells in the region is estimated to be 40 0 times the 
world average. Burgan field in south east Kuwait is only 
14 to 20 miles from the Gulf. A network of gathering lines 
1. Kubursi, Atif A, Oil Industrialization and Development 
in the Arab Gulf States, Croom Helm, London (U.K.) 
1984, p. 42. 
Table 2.1 
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Proven Crude Oil Reserves 
(as on January 1, 1994) 
Oil 
(OOObbl) 
Gas 
(bcf) 
Kuwait 9,40,00,000 52,400 
Saudi Arabia 25,87,03,000 1,85,360 
Bahrain 69,584 5,900 
Qatar 37,29,000 2,50,000 
UAE 9,81,00,000 2,04,600 
Oman 47,00,000 20,000 
GCC 45,93,01,584 7,18,260 
Middle East 66,28,65,935 15,80,974 
OPEC 77,21,30,820 20,20,448 
World 99,91,23,702 50,16,213 
Source: Compiled and computed from International Petroleum 
Encyclopedea, Vol. 27, Penwell, Tulsa, U.S.A., 
1994, pp. 300-301. 
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Table 2.2 
Percentage of Proven Crude Oil Reserves 
(as on January 1, 1994) 
GCC Middle East OPEC World 
Kuwait 20. .46 14, .18 12. .17 9. .40 
Saudi Arabia 56, .32 39, .02 33, .50 25, .89 
Bahrain 0, .01 0, .01 0, .009 0, .006 
Qatar 0. ,81 0, .56 0, .48 0, .37 
UAE 21, .35 14, .79 12, .70 9, .81 
Oman 1. .02 0, .70 0, .60 0, .47 
GCC - 69, .29 59, .48 45, .97 
Middle East - - 85. .84 66, .34 
World - - - 77, .28 
Source: Computed from Table 2.1 
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Table 2.3 
Percentage of Gas Reserves 
(as on January 1, 1994) 
GCC Middle East OPEC World 
Kuwait 7, .29 3, .31 2. .59 1, .04 
Saudi Arabia 25, .80 11, .72 9. .17 3, .69 
Bahrain 0, .82 0, .37 0. .29 0, .11 
Qatar 34. .80 15, .81 12, .37 4. .98 
UAE 28, .48 12, .94 10. .12 4, .07 
Oman 2, .78 1, .26 0, .98 0, .39 
GCC - 45, .43 35. .54 14, .31 
Middle East - - 78, .24 31, .51 
OPEC - - - 40, .27 
Source: Computed from Table 2.1 
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Tabe 2.4 
Oil Production 
(Thousand Barrels per day) 
1993 
Kuwait 1,692.1 
Saudi Arabia 7,981.3 
Bahrain 36.0 
Qatar 427.5 
UAE 2,189.2 
Oman 774.8 
GCC 13,100.9 
Middle East 18,323.4 
OPEC 24,329.7 
World 59,618.5 
Source: Compiled and computed from International 
Petroleum Encyclopedea, Vol. 27, Penwell, Tulsa, 
U.S.A., 1994, pp. 290-293. 
Table 2.5 
Percentage of Petroleiun Production 
(1993) 
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GCC Middle East OPEC World 
Kuwait 12. .91 9. ,23 6. ,95 2. ,83 
Saudi Arabia 60. .92 43. .55 32. .80 13, .38 
Bahrain 0, .27 0. ,19 0, .14 0, .06 
Qatar 3. .26 2, .33 1. .75 0. .71 
UAE 16, .71 11, .94 8, .99 3, .67 
Oman 5, .91 4, .22 3, .18 1 .29 
GCC - 71, .49 53, .84 21 .97 
Middle East - - 75 .31 30 .73 
OPEC - - - 40 .80 
Source: Computed from Table 2.4 
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connects all wells in this field to the storage tanks at 
Al-Ahmadi on a ridge which is 400 feet above the sea 
level, six miles from the Gulf. Pipelines from the storage 
farms use gravity to feed oil to the terminal at 
Al-Ahmadi. Loading by gravity instead of pumps cuts down 
the costs substantially and speeds up the process. Same is 
the situation for most oil wells in the region e.g. Dukhan 
in Qatar, Zakum in the UAE, Ghawar in Saudi Arabia. 
Besides this there is also the advantage of the falling 
unit costs of transporting oil across the oceans as larger 
and larger super tankers have been brought into use. This 
has been particularly important with respect to the US and 
Japanese market, where Arabian Gulf oil can be delivered 
at prices below the corresponding domestic production 
costs and/or competitors' cost^. 
If the oil resources were to last for ever then 
the GCC countries would have qualified for everlasting oil 
revenues and economic diversification would not have been 
an important consideration. But as said earlier oil 
resources are finite and non-renewable. At the given rate 
of exploitation, oil in the GCC will run out in the 
lifetime of the present generation (Qatar, Bahrain, Omanj, 
its children (UAE), or its grandchildren (Saudi Arabia and 
2. Ibid. 
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Kuwait). The accumulation of large financial surpluses in 
the early 1970s preceded any deliberate plan for their 
domestic absorption or investment abroad. There was no 
historical experience on which to base predictions of 
further growth in domestic absorption and, therefore no 
reason to question the economic rationality of a surplus 
of the magnitude realized. However, GCC producers are no 
longer oblivious to the risks accumulating fixed income 
yielding assets in an inflationary world. They are, 
therefore, no longer satisfied with their role as just the 
residual suppliers of the world crude oil requirements. 
Now they are contemplating the creation of an advanced and 
integrated industrial base and the expansion of their 
sphere of control over the transportation, refining, 
processing and marketing of their oil and its derivatives^. 
Since oil is a depleting resource GCC countries 
should be keenly aware of the current savings and 
investment needs of their economies if economic output is 
4 
to be maintained as oil is depleted . Percentage of 
petroleum export revenues to total exports is too heavy 
for the six GCC countries (see Tables 1. 2-1. 7 in chapter 1) 
3. Ibid, p. 43. 
4. Askari Hossein and Dastmaltschi, "Evolution of a GCC 
Oil Policy", in Sandwick, John A. (ed). The Gulf 
Cooperation Council, Moderation and Stability in an 
Interdependent World, Westview Press, Boulder (U.S.A.) 
1987, p. 90. 
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Given the extreme contingence of these countries on oil 
revenues a coordinated and thoroughly planned oil policy 
becomes a logical requisite. Astute management of the 
exchange reserves and sound investments both in domestic 
and overseas markets is equally required. 
GCC and the Oil Policy 
The unified Economic Agreement was drawn up on the 
8th of June 1981 and on the 20th of March 1982, the OPEC 
agreed to an overall production ceiling of 17.5 million 
b/d. On 14th March 1983 OPEC agreed on a price cut from 
$34 per barrel to $29 per barrel. These two decisions led 
to price and production discrepancies among the producers^. 
During this period the GCC was very active in 
persuading the members to agree to the price cut. Abdullah 
Bishara, the then Secretary General of the GCC in 1982 
said "Whether we like it or not, OPEC revolves around the 
GCC"®. The idea of price cut became a keynote with the GCC 
oil ministers.^ Mana Said A1 Otaiba the then Minister of 
Petroleum and Natural Resources of the UAE threatened 
5. Dietl Gulshan, Through Two Wars and Beyond, A Study of 
Gulf Cooperation Council, Lancers Books, New Delhi, 
India, 1991, p. 214. 
6. Denver, Louise, "Energy: Gulf Cooperation Council", 
Saudi Business, 16 April 1983, p. 28. 
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openly by saying, "we hope the OPEC ministers will agree 
to a new price below the current basic price of $34 a 
barrel. Otherwise we, the Arabian Gulf states will take 
another path"^. The changing relationship was once again 
cordial with the price cut being agreed to by all the 
members. 
The GCC states were affected not only by the 
collapse of prices but the price structure also. If the 
pricing structure was not fixed, the GCC states would have 
faced not just a decline in incomes but would have lost 
Q 
the very basis of their financial planning . 
Another factor that had its impact on the GCC 
policies within the OPEC was the Iran-Iraq war. There were 
attempts to ill-equip Iran v/ith its ability to wage a war. 
The non-Gulf OPEC members increasingly resented the war-
motivated price formulations and saw the struggle in the 
bitter words of one spokesman as "their guns and our 
9 
butter" . The Iranians branded it as "oil conspiracy" and 
a sell out. 
7. FBIS-MEA, 24 February 1983. 
8. Roberts, John, "The Effect of the Oil Price Collapse 
on the Gulf Cooperation Council Economies", The 
Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. 12, No. 1, 
Autumn 1986, Colorado, U.S.A., pp. 103-104. 
9. Stevens, Paul, "Oil and OPEC" in the Symposium on the 
Post-War Arab Gulf, University of Exeter, 12-14 July 
1989, p. 8. 
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Outside the OPEC, the GCC cooperation in oil 
related areas manifested itself in grand designs most of 
them have been left incomplete, some of them not even 
started. One such initiative was to build a GCC wide gas 
grid. Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE are the gas-haves in the 
Council-Qatar having the largest gas field in the world. 
As the oil production was curtailed in line with the OPEC 
quota, the gas production fell off as well severely 
affecting the Saudi petrochemical industry and Kuwait 
refinery. The GCC considered proposals to develop the 
Qatari North Field throughout 1983 and 1984. The cost of 
the venture and the Qatari-Bahraini dispute over the area 
finally killed the project. Since then the Qatar General 
Petroleum Corporation has taken it up and plans to extend 
the grid not only to Iraq, Syria and Jordon, but also to 
the Pacific Rim^^. 
Two oil related projects to be executed were a 
250,000 b/d refinery in Salalah, Oman and a 1,700 Km oil 
pipeline to link the GCC states with Oman. The pipeline 
was to connect with a terminal in one of the three points 
in Oman, Salalah, Sur or Kuria Muria Bay. The financial 
implications, Iranian reservations to the idea and 
10. Parker, Mushtak, "Not Spectacular but Defnitely 
Solid", The Middle East,February 1990, London U.K., 
p.20. 
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technical constraints did not allow the projects to take 
off. Since then, the Saudi Arabian oil pipeline connecting 
the oil at the east coast to the port of Yanbu on the west 
coast has sealed all further prospects of the project 
being revived in future. Also improvements in the Omani 
port facilities for oil exports in the case of unforeseen 
disruptions of the Gulf oil traffic was considered and 
not implemented. 
The Energy Coordination Committee comprising the 
GCC oil ministers in early 1982 decided to produce and 
market oil on behalf of the member state whose oil 
infrastructure and export potential was impaired due to 
some reason. A strategic oil reserve was proposed in order 
to cope up with such a situation. But soon Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait built up their own floating stockpile for this 
purpose. By October 1985 the Coordination Committee 
amended the decision to a forty five day national 
strategic reserve in each of the GCC member states thus 
accepting and legitimizing the Saudi and Kuwaiti actions. 
The Coordination Committee has been instrumental in 
conducting discussions, exchange of information, 
coordination on various matters and commissioning studies. 
1986 witnessed the firming up of oil price, better 
compliance with the quota allotments and change of the 
Saudi oil ministers from Zaki al Yamani to Hisham Nazer. 
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Since Yamani's stepping down the GCC oil policies 
have been marked with the increasing royal involvement. 
King Fahd in Saudi Arabia has been showing keen interest 
in oil issues inspite of the oil minister Nazer. Similarly 
the Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheikh Saad is 
increasingly vocal on his country's oil policy. The UAE has 
established a Supreme Petroleum Council (SPC) under Crown 
Prince Sheikh Khalifa Bin Nahyan. The SPC is a supreme 
body for hydrocarbons and above the oil ministry. This 
trend whether it is in the interest of better coordination 
of the GCC oil policy is yet to be seen^^. 
Oil and Gas Scenario in the Member States: 
Oil and gas scenario in each member state is 
discussed below: 
KUWAIT: 
Oil Production; 
Oil was discovered in 1938 by the Kuwait Oil 
Company (KOC), then jointly owned by BP and Gulf Oil. 
Production began in 1946 and reached 1.83 million b/d in 
1962. It peaked at 3.3 million b/d in 1972 at which point 
an output ceiling of 2 million b/d was introduced for the 
11. Reference 5 pp. 216-217. 
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purpose of conservation. Proven reserves were 94 billion 
barrels at the beginning of 1992 giving Kuwait the fourth 
largest reserves of oil in OPEC. Kuwait oil is somewhat 
heavier than Saudi crudes, with a higher sulphur content, 
but the geology is extremely favourable and production 
costs in Kuwait were estimated at $0.15/b before the war. 
After various changes in profit sharing and ownership, KOC 
was fully nationalized by 1975. In 1980, the industry was 
further reorganized under the umbrella of Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation (KPC), which directly controls five major 
subsidiaries KOC which is responsible for oil and gas 
production outside the Neutral Zone; Kuwait National 
Petroleum Corporation (KNPC), which controls refining, gas 
processing and product marketing. Petrochemical Industries 
Company (PIC), which manages domestic petrochemical and 
fertilizer production, Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC) 
which is responsible for the transportation of crude oil 
and liquified petroleum gas (LPG), and Kuwait Foreign 
Petroleum Exploration Company (Kufpec), which undertakes 
exploration activities in overseas concessions. 
Oil production from the Neutral Zone is handled by 
the Arabian Oil Company, a Japanese concern which splits 
the production between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Since 1983 
Kuwait's share of this production has been in the region 
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of 125,000-200,OOOb/d, the bulk (about 125,000 b/d) of 
which was sold on behalf of the Iraqi government until the 
end of 1988. After the October 1986 OPEC conference 
instituted strict production control, Kuwait accepted 
severe output cutbacks which kept its production below 
1.25 million b/d excluding its share from the Neutral 
Zone- Due to the perennial problem of over production by 
other OPEC members and Kuwait's desire to dampen any 
increase in the price of oil. Kuwait took an increasingly 
hard line in the cartel after 1987. Between June 1989 and 
January 1990 it formally repudiated its OPEC quota and in 
return was granted substantially higher market share. 
However, it failed to keep even within its new output 
limit of 1.5 million b/d during 1990, until the Iraqi 
invasion shut down almost all its production. 
Iraqi sabotage took place at 810 of Kuwait's 1,080 
wells, resulting in 742 wells being set on fire. 
Approximately 100 of the fires blew themselves out as a 
result of loss of reservoir pressure and the remainder 
were out by an international effort involving 27 different 
groups of firefighters. Initial estimates by KOC suggested 
that 5% of its wells had been irreparably damaged and an 
extensive re-drilling programme covering 100-150 new 
wells began in 1992. KOC also estimated that it lost 3% of 
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its recoverable reserves as a result of the fires. The 
latter is a difficult number to substantiate because of 
the probable damage caused to reservoirs after the war by • 
the rapid increase in the output ordered by the Kuwaiti 
government. By the end of 1992, evidence of reservoir 
damage was sufficiently serious for KOC to begin extensive 
studies of reservoir behaviour. During the Iraqi 
occupation, Kuwait oil production dropped to negligible 
levels. Token production and exports began in June 1991 
and output had increased to 460,000 b/d by the final 
quarter. During 1992 output continued its rapid increase, 
reaching 1 million b/d by mid-year and an average of 1.45 
million b/d by the fourth quarter. 
Oil Pricing; 
Until the OPEC price structure collapsed under the 
strains of the market share strategy in early 1986, 
Kuwait's prices had been adjusted in line with the cartel 
agreements on differentials. Since the dramatic price cuts 
of 1986, KPC has experimented with three major types of 
price structure. Intiailly it adopted netback pricing, 
which in 1986 and early 1987 covered about one quarter of 
its exports. The "tanker war" in the Gulf put strong 
downward pressure on Kuwaiti crudes, which KPC dealt with 
by shifting to spot sales linked to the price of Oman and 
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Dubai crudes on the spot market. With the expanding output 
and in particular its aggressive marketing in the USA 
during 1989, KPC increased its term contracts mostly of 
three month duration - which by the third quarter of 1989 
accounted for the bulk of its exports. These contracts are 
substantially different from the old, pre-1980 long- term 
contracts which KPC had with Western buyers, mainly BP, 
Gulf and Shell. The modern contracts have prices set by 
average spot values in the appropriate regional markets. 
Oil Refining: 
Before the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait had the third 
largest refining capacity in OPEC, after Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela. It had undertaken a major modernization 
programme at two of its three refineries, geared to making 
output suitable for export markets. Total refining 
capacity was increased from 520,000 b/d to 730,000 b/d at 
the end of 1989, comprising 330,000 b/d at Mina-al-Ahmadi, 
200,000 b/d at Mina-al-Abdullah and 200,000 b/d at Shuaiba 
In July 1989, a 38,000 b/d isocracker unit came on stream 
at Mina-al-Abdullah and a 1,300 b/d methyl tetra butyl 
ether (MTBE) unit is being built at Mina-al-Ahmadi. 
The rapid shutdown of Kuwait's refineries and 
looting of equipment by the Iraqis resulted in superficial 
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damage to the Mina-al-Abdullah refinery and extensive 
damage to the Shuaiba refinery. After minor repairs at 
Mina-al-Ahmadi, it was the first to be reactivated, with 
Mina-al-Abdullah being partially reactivated in early 
1992. By June 1992 refinery throughput reached a plateau 
of 320,000 b/d. Refinery repairs have received relatively 
low priority in the Kuwaiti oil reconstruction programme. 
The main damage caused by the Iraqis was to refinery 
control rooms and the sophisticated catalytic cracking and 
reforming units which had been added in the modernization 
programme of the mid 1980s. 
KPC's purchases of overseas interests began in 
1981, when it acquired the US oil engineering and 
exploration firm, Santa Fe International. The following 
year it started buying petrol stations in Europe from some 
of the oil majors, particularly Gulf Oil. After the 
purchase of a significant share in the UK in October 1986 
and March 1987, KPC's total European netv/ork exceeded 
4,800 stations in Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, The 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and the UK. It also owns ex-Gulf 
refineries in Rotterdam and at Gulfhavn in Denmark, and 
lube oil plants in Italy and the UK. In September 1986 KPC 
introduced a new brand name - Q8- for all its retail sales 
in Europe, where it is now a high profile distributor. At 
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the and of 1987 Kuwait's total overseas refining and 
retailing operations accounted for 250,000 b/d. 
Between October 1987 the Kuwait Investment Office 
(KIO) bought 22% of the shares of BP on the open market, a 
purchase which was referred to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission. The British government decided to put a 9.9% 
limit on the KIO's stake in BP, so that 11.7% was sold at 
the end of 1988, albeit at a substantial profit. However, 
the pace of KPC's European acquisitions has slowed down 
since 1987 and in late 1989 KPC sold the engineering arm 
of Santa Fe International. KPC has other overseas 
interests, including shares in Tunisian and Turkish 
fertilizer complexes and a major prospective plant in 
China. Through Kufpec it holds exploration bases in a 
number of developing countries and has access to 75,000 
b/d of equity crude from production concessions outside 
Kuwait. 
Natural Gas: 
Kuwati's natural gas reserves at the beginning of 
1992 were estimated at 48,000 billion cubic ft but are 
mainly in the form of associated gas. Production has 
therefore been dependent on oil output and has fluctuated 
sharply in recent years. There is a liquified petroleum 
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gas (LPG) plant at Mina-al-Ahmadi, which was opened in 
1979 using gas that was formerly flared and which in 1988 
accounted for 16% of OPEC LPG production. However, the 
fall in oil prices in 1986 severely affected gas prices, 
with Kuwait forced to slash its propane and butane prices 
by more than half. After a short lived recovery in 
mid-1988, prices slumped later in the year and 
subsequently remained depressed. This reduced the 
attractiveness of investments to upgrade the country's gas 
utilization capacity. LPG exports were interrupted by the 
12 war and resumed on a much reduced scale in July 1992 
SAUDI ARABIA: 
Oil: 
Saudi Arabia's proven recoverable oil reserves at 
the start of 1992 were estimated at 255,842 million 
barrels, equal to just under a quarter of the world's 
total known reserves. Most of these reserves are located 
in the Eastern Province and its offshore, where the Saudi 
Arabian American Oil Company (Saudi Aramco) operates. The 
company's concession area in Saudi Arabia covers 220,000 
sq.km. (189.00 sq. km on shore, 31,000 sq.km. off shore) 
in six non-contiguous "retained areas" that remain 
12. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile-Kuwait, 
1992-93, The Economist, London, U.K. pp. 16-19. 
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unrelinquished from an original concession area of 
1,285,000 sq. km. All Aramco oil production is lifted from 
the vast Retained Area No. 1, which contains the world's 
largest producing field, Ghawar and the world's largest 
offshore field Safaniya. Other major fields in the area 
are at Abqaiq, Ain Dar, Berri, Zuluf, Khursaniya, Abu 
Safah (output shared 50:50 with Bahrain) and Qatif. In 
Retained Area No. 5, south of the border with Abu Dhabi, 
there are two proven oil fields, Shayba and Ramla and 
three gas fields Suhul and North and South Kidan, but none 
of these is in production. Since 1987 Aramco has been 
encouraged by the Saudi government to explore outside its 
concession area and in 1990 announced the discovery of six 
oil and gas fields in Nejd. 
Other oil producers in Saudi Arabia are Getty Oil 
and the Japanese Arabian Oil Company. The former has a 
4,000 sq. km. concession area onshore and a 1,000 sq.km. 
area offshore in the Neutral Zone, where the latter also 
has a 2,800 sq.km. area offshore. Several international 
companies have been involved in minor exploration ventures 
in conjunction with the state company Petromin. They 
include Tenneco, Erap (Elf-Aquitaine), Eni, Phillips 
Petroleum, Sinclair and Natomas, but the groups have 
either relinquished acreage or lapsed into inactivity. 
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Apart from the eastern province areas along the Red Sea 
and in Central Arabia have been surveyed and in 1990 Saudi 
Aramco was given responsibility for a further evaluation 
of the hydrocarbons potential of the Red Sea Coast. 
Saudi Aramco is responsible for 97% of all Saudi 
Arabia's crude oil production and all of the natural gas 
liquids (NGL). The country's predecessor, Aramco^^, began 
commercial production in 1938 and upto the end of 1990 
cumulative production had reached 62.4 billion barrels 
Saudi oil output grew rapidly during the 1970s from an 
average 4.77 million b/d in 1971 to an average 9.9 million 
b/d in 1980 but the rise was not steady. The Arab oil 
embargo showed this spectacular growth in 1974 and output 
actually fell in 1975. In 1978 slack demand prompted a 
fall in production compared with 1977, but in 1979, in the 
13. During 1988 to 1989 a radical reorganization of the 
Saudi oil industry was effected, which involved the 
final full nationalization of oil and gas producing 
monopoly through the restructuring of Aramco to the 
new Saudi Aramco Company the emasculation of Petromin 
(established 1962) the previous operating arm of the 
oil ministry and the rationalization of the kingdoms' 
refining interests into two independent entities: 
Petrolube, which will oversee Saudi blending and 
lubricant plant interests and Saudi Arabian Refining 
and Marketing Company (SAMArec), which has been given 
responsibility for the kingdom's domestic and export 
oriented refineries and the sale of their products on 
both local and international markets. 
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wake of the Iranian revolution, output was raised to 9.5 
million b/d, 1 million b/d in excess of a production 
ceiling decreed by the government only the previous year. 
Towards the end of 1980 output was again raised to over 10 
million b/d as the result of further falls in oil supply 
from Iran and Iraq, but from early 1982 a world glut of 
crude oil led to a decline in sales and production; the 
existence of excess global output capacity continued to 
affect, Saudi output and marketing policies throughout the 
1980s and into 1990. 
Beginning in August 1985 Saudi Arabia abandoned its 
policy of official posted pricing in line with OPEC 
agreements and introduced a "netback" pricing formula 
whereby the price of crude was calculated on the basis of 
returns from refined product sales minus agreed freight, 
insurance and refining charges. 
By assuring the lifters of Saudi crude a guaranteed 
profit in this manner, the Saudis were successful in 
lifting production upto their OPEC quota of 4.35 million 
b/d but at the cost of causing a collapse in world oil 
prices that meant theiij overall revenues did not increase 
significantly in the short term. During 1986 Saudi Arabia 
persisted with its policy, further sweetened the pricing 
system with discounts and raised production above 5 
61 
million b/d in the summer months. Saudi policy makers 
claimed that they were seeking not merely to restore oil 
production to acceptable levels but also to ensure the 
long term competitiveness of their major export. But there 
was evidence of some unease at the size of the fall in oil 
prices and during 1986 Saudis first agreed to the 
re-establishment of production rationing and then 
following the dismissal of their longstanding oil 
minister, Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, to the reintroduction 
of official selling prices to come into effect in February 
1987. These were re-established on the basis of a market 
price of $ 18/b, which represented the average of seven 
crudes rather than the price of Saudi Arabia's own Arabian 
light crude only, as in the past. During 1988, Saudi 
Arabia again abandoned fixed pricing in its determination 
to seek its full quota of oil and later in the year began 
deliberately to exceed this quota. In 1989 strong global 
demand for oil enabled OPEC to increase its quotas on two 
occasions, with Saudi Arabia's individual quota rising 
back above 5 million b/d for the last quarter. Following 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia was given 
permission by OPEC to raise production to compensate for 
the shutt off of Iraqi and Kuwaiti exports. Output quickly 
rose from around 5.5 million b/d to 8 million b/d, a level 
maintained through 1991 and 1992. On February 15, 1992, 
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OPEC reinforced quotas on its members and Saudi Arabia was 
allocated 7.88 million b/d. The kingdom formally rejected 
its allocation, insisting on a production level of 8 
million b/d, a position which it adhered to throughout the 
year. 
In 1988, Saudi Arabia entered into an agreement with 
one of its former Aramco partners, Texaco to become a 
partner in Texaco's US east coast refinery and marketing 
network, thus securing a permanent lifting commitment for 
upto 600,000 b/d of its crude. The kingdom has expressed 
interest in deals of similar nature in western Europe and 
the Far East and in 1991 concluded an agreement to enter 
the South Korean market. Over the last few years Saudi 
Aramco has developed a highly effective US marketing 
strategy involving the supply of short haul crude out of 
storage in the Caribbean. Saudi Arabia continues to honour 
long term and large contracts with its former US partners-
Texaco, Mobil, Exxon and Chevron-and has also entered into 
several long term barter agreements selling oil to cover 
arms purchases. Crude oil lifted by Getty Oil is delivered 
to Mina Saud for export or for refining in the company's 
refinery. The Arabian oil Company has an export refinery 
at Al-Khafji and the company's crude production is either 
refined there for export or delivered straight to tankers 
at the same location. 
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Gas: 
Saudi Arabia was estimated to have proven gas 
reserves of 184 trillion cubic feet at the beginning of 
1992, the fifth largest in the world after the former 
USSR, Iran, Qatar and the USA. During 1985, the kingdom 
implemented schemes to harness just under 1 billion cubic 
ft/d of non-associated gas so ensuring the supply of fuel 
gas for Eastern province industry by freeing the kingdom 
from gas asociated with fluctuating crude oil production. 
Aramco started commercial production of gas in Saudi 
Arabia in 1962 when it began extracting natural gas 
liquids (NGLs) from oil field gas and processing them at 
an NGL plant at the Ras Tanura refinery and export 
terminal. In 1977 Aramco installed a gas seperation and 
gathering scheme on the Berri field which was designed to 
process 6.2 million cubic ft. of associated gas a year and 
simultaneously worked as agent for Petromin on building 
the governments' own Master Gas System (MGS). The scheme 
as completed in 1981 provides for the gathering of 3 
billion cubic ft/d of associated gas and the processing 
of this gas to extract ethane, methane, sulphur, LPG and 
natural gasoline-the ethane (375 million cubic ft/d) being 
made available as a feedstock for the kingdoms ethylene 
crackers, the methane (2 billion cubic ft/d) being used 
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for fertilizer and methanol production and to provide fuel 
for desalination plants. Power stations and other 
industrial projects and the NGLs (300,000 b/d) being 
largely exported. The Shedgum gas seperation plant was 
completed in 1980/ the 300,000 b/d of ethane and NGL 
seperated from the methane being piped to a secondary 
fractionation plant at Juayma for separation into 160,000 
b/d of LPG and natural gasoline for export and 160 million 
cubic ft/d of ethane which is piped to Jubail as feedstock 
for the petrochemical plants there. A twin plant on the 
huge Ghawar field was finished at Uthmaniya in 1981 and it 
is from this plant that the ethane/NGL stream is piped 
across the peninsula to Yanbu using approximately 30,000 
b/d of fuel in the pumping process. The two plants at 
Uthmaniya and Shedgum also produce about 2,500 tons of 
sulphur a day. The gas gathering system will be further 
enhanced by current work on harnessing gas output from the 
14 northern offshore fields of Zuluf and Marjan 
BAHRAIN: 
Oil: 
It is 60 years since oil was discovered in Bahrain 
with production and refining beginning soon after. Output 
14. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile - Saudi 
Arabia, 1992-93. The Economist, London, U.K., 
pp.21-25. 
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from the onshore Awali field peaked at 76,639 b/d in 1970 
but declined at an average rate of 5% to 6% per year until 
the mid-1980s and has since stabilized above 39,000 b/d. 
However, at current levels of production reserves will be 
exhausted by the end of the century. 
In December 1979 the government which then owned 60% 
of the Awali field took over the remaining 40% from 
Standard oil of California and Texaco through the Bahrain 
National Oil Company (Banoco), the main operator at the 
field. The field! s output sold to the Bahrain Petroleum 
Company (Bapco). A major programme to explore for new 
sources of oil and gas was launched in 1981 in the hope of 
discovering small, commercially viable sources of oil and 
gas that would prolong the country's diminishing energy 
supplied. By 1986 no significant discoveries had been 
made. It took five years for the next exploratory well to 
be drilled. This was spudded in 1991 by the US based 
Harken Energy following its signing of a 35 year 
production sharing agreement covering virtually all 
Bahrain's offshore area. However, initial tests yielded no 
new finds. 
Refining; 
Bahrain is unique among the GCC sates in that it 
exports only petroleum products and no crude. Bahrain's 
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own oil supplies can meet only 17% of the need of its 
250,000 b/d capacity refinery at Sitra and the remainder 
is piped from Saudi Arabia, In 1981 the government took 
60% participation in the Sitra refinery and its related 
facilities, with Caltex the original owner, retaining 40%. 
A light isomate plant was added in 1983 and more recently 
work has begun on the long delayed expansion of the plant. 
A total of $500 million to $600 million is to be spent 
over the next five years in upgrading the refinery, 
raising capacity from the current level of 250,000 b/d to 
360,000 b/d. The refinery's profits have fluctuated 
greatly in the past decade. It was hard hit by the price 
measures of 1979-80 and average throughput fell from 
259,000 b/d in 1981 to 175,000 b/d in 1983. By 1986, 
however, throughput had returned to 245,000 b/d, at about 
which level it has remained. In the first half of 1991, 
throughput averaged 252,000 b/d, exceeding the design 
capacity in the unusual market conditions prevailing 
during the 1991 Gulf war. 
Gas; 
Bahrain is becoming an important producer of non-
associated gas. Reserves including those of the Khuff Zone 
which underlies a large part of the Gulf, are estimated at 
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263 billion cubic m, allowing output to continue for upto 
60 years at present production levels. 
The main uses of gas are reinjection, power 
generation, refining and supply to the Aluminium Bahrain 
(Alba) aluminium smelter and the gas liquids plant 
operated by the Bahrain National Gas Company (Banagas). 
Banagas is 75% owned by Banoco, with Caltex and the Arab 
Petroleum Investment Corporation holding 12,5% each. The 
company's central gas plant was first fully utilized in 
1988 and process a total of 1.6 billion cubic m of 
associated gas, generating propane, butane and naptha. The 
expansion of the plants capacity to 7.9 million cubic m/d 
was completed in mid-1990 and further expansion plants are 
under consideration. The company is also considering 
whether to establish a methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) 
plant although this is dependent on the modernization of 
Bapco's Sitra refinery, Bahrain is a partner with Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf Petrochemical Industries 
Corporation (GPIC) Sitra plant, which was commissioned in 
July 1985 with a capacity of 1,000 tons/d of methanol and 
ammonia, most of which is exported to Europe, other parts 
of the Arab world and the Far East GPIC is considering 
building an additional urea plant. The company exported a 
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total of 825,852 tons of ammonia, urea and methanol in 
1990, 10% up on 1989 and reported an operating profit of 
$2.7 million^^. 
QATAR: 
Oil was discovered in 1939 in Qatar. The first crude 
shipment was made in 1949 from the on shore Dukhan field 
on the east side of the peninsula via a pipeline to a 
terminal at Umm Said. The first offshore field was 
discovered at Idd-al-Shargi in 1960 and a second was found at 
Mayadan Mahzam the same year. In 1965 a production complex 
to serve both fields was completed using a terminal at 
Halul Island. In 1970, a third offshore field was 
discovered at Bui Hanine. Qatar also shares a small 
offshore field, Bunduq on a 50:50 basis with Abu Dhabi. 
Total proven oil reserves were estimated at 4.5 billion 
barrels at the beginning of 1991. 
Qatar's oil production stood at about 400,000 b/d -
500,000 b/d during the 1970s but fell to much lower levels 
in the 1980s. The oil price collapse of 1986 halved the 
emirates oil export earnings. Hindered by a relatively 
high official price for its crude exports, Qatar's output 
fell from 289,000 b/d in January 1987 to a low of around 
15. Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile-Behrain 
and Qatar, 1992-93. The Economist, London, U.K., 
pp.11-12. 
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100,000 b/d in April of that year. Following the 
introduction of discounting, production picked up and 
averaged 291,000 b/d over the whole year. The final 
quarter also saw the reversion to the old system of 
linking the price to that of Omani crude. In the years 
following the crash, production steadily increased and was 
boosted by the onset of the Gulf crisis in 1990 to reach 
400,000 b/d through most of 1991. Total term crude oil 
contracts account for 337,000 b/d of output, most of which 
is taken by Japanese companies. The onshore Dukhan field 
was originally operated by the Qatar Petroleum Company 
(QPC), owned by BP, CFP, Shell, Exxon/Mobil and Partex. 
The state took a 25% interest in QPC in 1973, increasing 
this to 60% in 1974 and 100% in 1976 through the Qatar 
Petroleum Producing Authority (QPPA), a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation 
(QGPC). The QGPC holds the state share in all oil, gas, 
petrochemical and refining enterprises in Qatar and 
abroad. In 1980 QPPA was merged with QGPC. In October 1991 
QGPC merged its onshore and offshore divisions converting 
itself from a holding company to an integrated oil 
operating company. It is hoped that the change will help 
QGPC achieve its objective of maintaining production at 
about 400,000 b/d to the year 2000, The off share 
operations contract held by Shell, expired at the end of 
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1991, while the onshore contract held by a consortium of 
Shell. Total, Partex of Japan, Exxon, Mobil and BP expired 
in Feburary 1992. QGPC was seeking to renegotiate the 
contracts on more favourable terms. 
Refineries; 
In 1975, QGPC brought a refinery into operation at 
Umm Said with a capacity of 6,000 b/d. By 1979 capacity at 
the refinery had increased to 12,000 b/d but this was not 
enough to meet the domestic demand. A new 50,000 b/d unit 
at Umm Said was opened in February 1984 to enable Qatar 
to meet its own domestic needs and export some porudcts as 
well. The refineries are managed by the National Oil 
Distribution Company (Nodco), a wholly owned subsidiary of 
QGPC, which also distributes products. The refineries were 
estimated to be running at a combined capacity of 62,000 
b/d in 1989 with all one but 18,000 b/d destined for 
export Technical and engineering studies have been carried 
out on raising the refineries total capacity to 74,000 b/d 
with the aim of increasing exports. An 11,000 b/d 
isomerization plant which converts light naptha into lead 
free petrol was opened in 1990. 
Gas: 
A natural gas liquids (NGL) plant based on Dukhan 
gas was brought into production in 1975 but was destoryed 
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by an explosion and fire in 1977. Another which was 
already under construction openedin 1980 and exports began 
in November 1981. This plant has a capacity of 960 t/d of 
propane, 443 t/d of natural gasoline. 7.1 million cubic 
m/d of methane and 1.5 million cubic m/d of ethane. Qatar 
also has a network of non-associated gas pipelines drawing 
feedstock from the Khuff layer under the Dukhan fields. 
This produces fuel for small generators for the Ras Abu 
Fontas electric power and desalination plant and the steel 
plant. Qatar's industries are dependent on the gas and the 
decline in oil production from the levels of 1970s has 
meant that the amount of associated gas available to 
industry has declined. Oil production rates of under 
400,000 b/d mean that there is insufficient gas to supply 
the two power stations and industry. This combined with 
the fact that Qatar's industrial and power needs were 
increasing upto 1986 by 10% a year made the exploitation 
of Qatar's extensive non-associated gas reserves 
essential. These lie in the offshore North Field 
separately discovered by Shell and Wintershall where 
proven reserves are estimated at 4.5 trillion cubic m. 
making it potentially one of the largest gas fields in the 
world. 
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Work on the project began in mid-1987 with all 23 
major contract packages awarded by mid-1989. Work had been 
expected to be completed by the end of 1990 with 
commercial production commencing during the first quarter 
of 1991. However, technical problems and the Gulf crisis 
caused delays and the field was officially opened in 
September 1991. 
The offshore facilities are located 75 km- from Ras 
Laffan and comprise six platforms including two well head 
platforms. Gas and condensates will be piped ashore to Ras 
Laffan and then to Umm Said where they will be processed 
at the new NGL-3 plant. The first phase of the project 
calls for the production of 22.6 million cubic m/d of gas 
and about 50,000 b/d of condensates although at the start 
of 1992 technical problems were reported to have 
constrained output below the Phase One target. About 12.7 
million cubic m/d of the gas is expected to be used by 
local industries and utilities with the remainder 
reinjected into the Dukhan Khuff reservoir. The 
condensates will be exported^^. 
UNITED MlAB EMIRATES: 
Oil and Gas: 
Oil is the mainstay of the UAE economy. It was 
discovered first in Abu Dhabi at the offshore field of Umm 
16. Ibid, pp. 28-30. 
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Shaif in 1958 and at the Bab field onshore in 1960. The 
fields were developed quickly and Abu Dhabi soon became a 
major oil exporter in world terms. Oil was discovered in 
Dubai in 1966 at the offshore Fateh field with production 
and exports starting in September 1969. The onshore oil 
and condensate field came on stream in 1983. Sharjah had a 
share in the small Mubarak field off Abu Musa island, 
from the time this came on stream in 1974. At the end of 
1980 Amoco made an oil and gas find at Sharjah's Sajaa 
field. Ras-al-Khaimah was the fourth emirate to find and 
exploit oil. Its offshore Saleh field was found by Gulf 
Oil's local subsidiary and announced in February 1983. The 
three remaining emirates are still looking for oil. 
The UAE has produced at higher levels from 1989 
when the UAE was awarded a cartel quota increase by OPEC 
from 0.988 million b/d to 1.095 million b/d out of a total 
cartel ceiling of 20.5 million b/d, even though actual 
production was running at 1.940 million b/d. Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait rendered the quota issue temporarily 
irrelevant as the UAE was encouraged to produce as much 
crude as it could, with Abu Dhabi providing virtually all 
incremental output. Production reached 2.1 million b/d in 
1990 and 2.5 million b/d in 1991. In February 1992, the 
UAE accepted a new OPEC target of 2.244 million b/d as the 
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cartel sought to reimpose production control on its 
members. This target represented 9.76% of the total OPEC 
ceiling, a share that the UAE feels is more in line with 
its production capacity and huge reserves. 
Despite recent finds in the smaller emirates, Abu 
Dhabi will continue to dominate in terms of production and 
reserves. Proven reserves as at the beginning of 1992 
stood at 98.1 billion barrels of which Abu Dhabi accounted 
for 92.2 billion barrels, Dubai 4 billion barrels. Sharjah 
1.5 billion barrels and Ras-al-Khaimah 400 million 
barrels. Thus the UAE accounts for 9.9% of the world crude 
oil reserves. This total represented a virtual trebling of 
the 1986 figure, based mainly on a very substantial 
increase in the recovery factor, the rate at some of the 
smaller fields has been as high as 50%. Abu Dhabi is also 
continually making new finds, especially offshore, or 
finding new structures in exsiting fields. It is expected 
to spend $3.5 billion in expanding refining capacity and 
boosting sustainable oil production capacity to 2.6 
million b/d. Dubai in contrast was experiencing a slight 
reduction in output from its existing fields prior to the 
discovery of its only onshore field. Margham, in 1982, the 
potential of Margham is affected by the need to reinject 
gas from the field to sustain pressure in the oil wells. 
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Likewise, much of the new output from the northern 
emirates is in the form of condensate and gas. This sets 
them apart from other members of OPEC since condensate is 
not covered by OPEC production quotas. 
The UAE was estimated to have natural gas reserves 
equivalent to 4.6% of the world total at the beginning of 
1992. Of this aggregate, Abu Dhabi accounts for 182.8 
billion cubic ft., Sharjah 10.7 billion cubic ft., Dubai 
4.6 billion cubic ft. and Ras-al-Khaimah 1.2 billion cubic 
ft., Abu Dhabi is keen to exploit its gas resources and in 
October 1990 awarded a major contract for the expansion of 
the Das Island liquified natural gas (LNG) plant. The 
ensuing work will double the LNG capacity presently 2.3 
million tons/year and extend facilities for other gas 
products and condensate. The UAE's marketed production of 
natural gas is expected to increase considerably in the 
coming years. 
Oil Consimption and Refining: 
In 1990 the UAE is estimated to have consumed about 
115,000 b/d of oil products, up from 87,400 b/d in 1985. 
Abu Dhabi is the only emirate currently hosting a crude 
oil refining sector. Its 75,000 b/d Umm al Nar and 120,000 
b/d Ruwais refineries are being upgraded to a joint 
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capacity of 600,000 b/d. There are also rather vague plans 
for a 120,000 b/d predominantly export refinery to be 
built at Jebel Ali in Dubai- In addition the UAE has a 
lube oil production capacity of 170,000 tons/year based on 
seven local and joint venture projects and Dugas is 
considering a 500,000 to 700,000 tons/year methyl tertiary 
butyl ether (MTBE) project also for Jebel Ali^^. 
OMAN: 
Oil: 
In Oman the main onshore oil concession is held by 
Petroleum Development Oman (PDO), which began life in 1937 
as Petroleum Concession (Oman), a subsidiary of the Iraq 
Petroleum Company. From 1960, the company was owned 85% by 
shell with Parts owing first 15% and later 5% the 
remaining 10% being taken up by Compagnie Francaise des 
Petroles (CFP). Since 1974 the shareholding has been: 
Shell, 34%, CFP, 4%, Partex, 2% and the state 60%. Since 
May 1980, the company has been registered in Oman, between 
1962 and 1964 PDO discovered three fields in the interior-
Yibal, Fahud and Natih - which began to export in August 
1967 through a 280 km pipeline and a coastal terminal at 
17. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile-UAE, 
1992-93. The Economist, London, U.K., pp. 16,17, 
18 & 20. 
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Mina-al-Fahal, north of Matrah. A fourth field Howaisah 
came into production in 1971 and a group of smaller fields 
at Ghaba in 1975. A further field Lekhwair began producing 
through a spur pipeline in 1976. 
After peaking at around 370,000 b/d in 1976 from 
the Central Oman fields, oil production declined as the 
need for secondary recovery increased and the outlook 
appeared bleak. Nor did immediate relief from elsewhere 
look likely as exploration and development in the south in 
and around Marmul in Dhofar had been delayed by the 
insurgency and the areas isolation, as well as by the 
heaviness of the oil which had been struck. The picture 
changed however, with rising oil prices and the attention 
of other international oil companies PDO built a 450 Km. 
pipeline from Marmul to the main pipeline running from 
Qarn al-Alam to the northern coast and in 1980 the Marmul 
field was brought into production. Fields around Marmul 
were also developed at Amal, Birba, Kawkab, Rabah, Qata 
and Qaharir. Other fields further north were discovered 
and/or developed including Rasha, Rima, Nimr and Karim 
West. In this area 1986 saw the opening of three more 
fields. Jahmud, Jalmud North and Jawda. More oil was 
discovered to be commercially exploitable in the area to 
the older central fields. Elf brought 
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its Sahma field (in the western concession) on stream in 
1980 (producing about 44,000 b/d) and a string of 
discoveries in 1983 adopted five fields to the list at 
Zauliya, Wafra, Sayyala, Fayyadh and Suwayhat. The oil in 
these fields is light 42°-50° API. Discoveries have also 
continued in other areas, central and further north. In 
addition . to the three southern fields mentioned above, 
four other fields were brought on stream in 1986. Hasirah, 
Warad, Simsim, Zahra, Ihsan, Jamil, Mawhoob, Dhiab, 
Thuleilat, Yibal Khuff and Al-Burj. In January 1988 the 
Rajaa oil field was discovered, it started production in 
the same year at 2,500 b/d. Further 13 discoveries 
followed in 1988 from north to south: A1 Huwaysah-49, 
Al-Huwaysah-48, Al-Huwaysah-50, Burhan-4, Mafrag-3, 
Rajaa-2, Sadad-3, Masseem-2, Al-Burj-2, Ihsan-3. 
Thamound-3, Masseem-2, Al-Burj-2, Zumurrud-1 and Bayyinah-1. 
PDO announced two new discoveries in 1989 at Hawqa and 
Al-Bur j and two more in 1991 at Wadi Haka and Tuqaa, 
although its first offshore well drilled in November 1991 
was a disappointment. Occidental announced a new discovery 
in its Sumayua concession in January 1992 and production 
started a month later. 
Total production capacity as a result of all this 
is now over 700,000 b/d, boosted by the expansion of 
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output in the Bahja fields (the 1983 discoveries) from 
5,000 b/d to 30,000 b/d in 1988. The throughput capacity 
of the principal oil pipeline was expanded to 650,000 b/d 
by the end of 1986, with booster stations this could be 
raised to 1.1 million b/d. In 1986 the storage capacity of 
the Mina-al-Fahal terminal was increased to 3.6 million 
barrels. Yibal is still producing over 150,000 b/d. Marmul 
31,000 b/d. Nimr 50,000 b/d and Lekhwair 26,000 b/d. PDO 
is currently engaged in a major field development project 
at Lekhwair to increase production from this field to 
125,000 b/d by the mid 1990s. Other major producing fields 
are Rima (74,000 b/d) and Fahud (52,000 b/d). 
PDO has operated on OPEC fiscal principles since 
the government acquired its 60% equity interest in 1974. 
The state sells part of its crude allocation directly but 
the remainder is taken by PDO buy back terms. All new 
concessions operate on a production sharing principle. 
Since the beginning of 1985 Oman has priced its crude on a 
monthly basis in accordance with a spot market related 
formula that is adjusted retroactively to ensure greater 
alignments with the market. Most Omani crude is sold on 
the basis of one year renewable contracts. In 1991, the 
government's monthly market assessment price for its 34® 
API crude averaged $17.45/b. 
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Oman's first oil refinery began operations at 
Mina-al-Fahal in November 1982. Its capacity was expanded 
in 1987 from 50,000 b/d to 80,000 b/d. It is run by the 
Oman Oil Refinery company with, since 1991, technical 
advice from a joint venture of Caltex and Transworld Oil. 
Gas; 
According of official estimates, Oman's booked 
proven reserves of recoverable natural gas at January, 
1992 were 347 billion cubic m. comprising 79 billion cubic 
m in associated gas and 268 billion cubic m. in 
non-associated gas. Most of the dry gas is produced at 
Yibal but extraction has also started at Fahud, Natih and 
Saih Nihayda in the north and Birba in the south. In June 
1989 PDO announced its largest gas discovery for 20 years, 
in the Saih Nihayda area (near Qarn-al-Alam) . A last 
minute decision to continue drilling below the target of 
3,700 m showed up gas at just below 4,000 m. The field's 
recoverable reserves are estimated at about 10 billion 
cubic m. In March 1991, another major find in the adjacent 
Saih Rawl field was announced with extra reserves of 1.4 
billion cubic m. and further large discoveries were made 
at Barik and Mabrook fields in 1991. These discoveries 
confirmed PDO's assumption that oil and gas in Oman are 
generatd from deep sources, rather than the generally 
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acknowledged more shallow ones and drilling plans have 
been revised accordingly. The new discoveries indicate 
that gas rather than oil will dominate exports in the 
future. A gas pipeline from the Yibal field to the 
outskirts of Muscat was opened in 1976 which provides fuel 
for the power and desalination plants at Ghubrah and for 
the industrial area at Rusail. After upgrading in 1986-89 
its capacity is now 15.6 million cubic m/d A branch line 
was opened in 1981 from Ghubrah to Sohar to fuel the new 
copper smelter. A new compressor station at the Yibal field 
came on stream in 1985. the IPC/Transworld Oil Consortium 
is currently developing the Bukha field, off Musandam, in 
a $60 million project which will make use of existing 
processing facilities at Ras-al-Khaimah in the UAE. It is 
expected to produce some 80 million cubic ft/d of gas and 
8,200 b/d of stable condensates. The utilization rate of 
associated gas in 1990 on PDO fields stood at over 81% up 
from a mere 5% in 1980. 
Several important gas projects were completed at 
the same time as the pipeline from the Yibal field, 
including a natural gas liquids (NGL) plant which produces 
some 3,500 b/d of gasoline liquids from associated gas. A 
big liquified petroleum gas (LPG) plant is being built at 
Sohar and smaller NGL plant has been opened at Saih Rawl. 
82 
Other are planned for Fahud and Lekhwair. A $9 billion LNG 
joint venture with Shell, primarily for export was 
announced in February 1992. Initial work on the project is 
expected to begin soon with exports to start at the end of 
18 the decade. Gas is also used for oil recovery 
18. Economist Intelligence Uni^, Country Profile-Oman and 
Yemen, 1992-93, The Economist, London, U.K., 
pp.17-21. 
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INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE GCC COUNTRIES 
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In the GCC region industrial development has 
trailed behind partly due to the opulence of oil and 
natural gas and whatsoever industrial development has 
generally been limited to petrochemicals production and 
non-durable consumer items, with scant if any production 
of basic metals, capital goods, high technology products, 
etc. The argument for the industrial development of the 
region is strengthened on following counts:^ 
i) The comparative advantage due to the low cost of 
natural resources available in abundant supply 
within the region. 
iij Manufacturing may generate the capacity to produce 
goods and machines embodying characteristics and 
specifications appropriate to their countries' 
factor proportions and tastes. 
iii) There is always the prospect of externalities from 
local production and industrial experience which 
can increase the efficiency of the entire economy. 
iv) Local productive capacity ensures a steady and 
reliable supply of critically needed products, in 
vulnerable times at least. 
1. Kubursi, Atif A., Oil Industrialization & Development 
in the Arab Gulf States, Croom Helm, London, U.K. 
p.102. 
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v) The promotion of manufacturing activity on a 
national and regional basis may allow the region to 
fill the enormous gaps and 'white spots' in its 
technical structure of production. 
Industrialization in Member States: 
KUWAIT: 
In Kuwait between 1974 and 1984 the industrial 
sector's rate of growth was 6.4%. But in 1985 it recorded 
a downfall of 4.2%. Between 1980 and 1988 average annual 
growth of 1.4% was recorded. In 1992 manufacturing 
contributed 14.4% of Kuwait's GDP. During the period 
1976-81 Five Year Plan, three industrial zones were 
established at Shuaiba, Shuwaikh and Ahmadi. Still oil 
related activities contribute a major share to Kuwait's 
total industrial output. Despite efforts to diversify the 
economy, petroleum's share of GDP rose from 61.1% in 1977 
to 69.9% in 1980, before falling to around 50% in 1983. 
Since then GDP has remained at approximately the same 
levels: according to provisional figures in 1992 the 
petroleum sector contributed an estimated KD2,720 million 
of GDP and the non-petroleum sector KD3,732 million, of 
which manufacturing sector contributed about 25%. Two 
fertilizer manufacturing units were set up in the mid 
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1960s and with a new fertilizer plant at Shuaiba (owned by 
KNPC), Kuwait could have a pontential production capacity 
of 1.65 million tons per year, mainly in the form of urea 
ammonia products. The profitability of these products is, 
however, proving difficult to maintain because of 
technical problems and a weak market. In addition, at the 
beginning of 1986 the EC imposed an 11% tariff on imports 
of urea from Kuwait after it had exceeded its duty free 
allocation. Two new projects were approved in 1985: the 
construction of a 150,000 ton capacity salt plant in 
Shuaiba, and a chlorine plant with an annual capacity of 
27,000 tons. In 1993 Union Carbide of the USA agreed to 
form_ajoint venture with PIC of Kuwait to develop a ma^or 
petrochemical complex, at an estimated cost of KD 700 
million, in Shuaiba. 
Kuwait has been hesitant to undertake heavy 
industrial projects, fearing both for their viability and 
the excess of foreign labour which they involve. It has 
favoured, instead joint projects with Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf countries, including agreements with 
the Gulf Aluminium Rolling Company and Gulf Petrochemical 
Industries Company to establish aluminium, ammonia and 
methanol plants in Bahrain. Towards the end of 1982 a 
joint venture was also set up between PIC and Tunisian 
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State-owned Maghrebia Chemical Industries to build a 1,000 
ton per day diammonium phosphate fertilizer plant in 
Kuwait at a cost of KD 16 million. At the end of 1987, KPC 
also agreed to take a majority shareholding in Bahrain's 
ailing Iron and Steel Company. In early 1989 Kuwait 
Petrochemicals Industries Company announced a joint 
venture with Union Carbide of the USA, for the production 
of polypropylene. 
Several factories supply consumer goods, such as 
processed food and soft drinks and there is a flour 
milling company. Kuwait's major branch of manufacturing, 
however, has been the production of building materials and 
related projects such as aluminium extrusion. The 
construction industry is considerable owing to the vast 
amount of infrastructural development since the early 
1970s. During the 1970s major projects were carried out by 
foreign contractors, but in February 1981 the National 
Housing Authority (NHA) announced that 80% of future 
housing contracts would be awarded to local firms. Between 
1974 and 1989 the NHA recorded 27,000 housing units built. 
An indication of Kuwait's heavy reliance on foreign labour 
is the 2.4 Km bridge from Subiya to Bubiyan island 
completed in 1982 by Chinese migrant workers. The economic 
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recession of the mid-1980s damaged the construction 
industry considerably and the collapse of the petroleum 
prices in 1986 further worsened the situation. In 1988, 
however there was a distinct recovery, particularly in the 
private residential sector, where expansion was stimulated 
by the availability of cheap bank credits as well as the 
completion of highway improvements in suburban Kuwait. The 
NHA's budget for 1988-89 was KD 142.3 million of which 
KD124.3 million was allocated to construction and 
maintenance work. The Al-Qurain complex, which will 
comprise 12,415 dwelling units was under construction 
prior to the Iraqi invasion. In 1989 work began on the 
Amiri Diwan, a government facility which was to cost an 
estimated KD 65 million - KD 80 million and was completed 
in 1992. After the Iraqi occupation, the Kuwaiti 
government worked with the international construction 
companies with which it was familiar, in particular US 
companies in order to rebuild Kuwait's infrastructure. 
Many of the smaller industrial projects have been 
promoted by the Industrial Bank of Kuwait (IBK), founded 
in 1973, which is 49% government owned. By 1984, however, 
four leading commercial banks had combined with IBK to 
form a more specific concern, the Industrial Investment 
Company (IIC), to make new investments. During 1985 the 
Government took a further step in assisting local industry 
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when it announced the interoduction of protectionist trade 
I 
measures for local industries which satisfy three 
criteria. Such industries should meet at least 40% of 
domestic requirements; should have a substantial added 
value and should contribute to national income; and the 
consumer should not be affected by any inflationary 
2 results of tariff protection . 
Table 3.1 gives an idea as to the various amounts 
of different commodities being produced in Kuwait. 
Growth in value added of the manufacturing sector 
was erratic during the 1980s but this sector's share of 
non-oil GDP was rising steadily prior to the Iraqi 
invasion, averaging 13.5% in 1982-86 and reaching a peak 
of 24% in 1989. 
The economic slowdown of 1985 caused serious 
problems for some industrial companies and a scheme was 
introduced in 1986 whereby the government bought out a 
total of 33 companies with the express purpose of closing 
most of them down. The government's protection measures of 
mid-1985 together with the recovery of the domestic 
economy in subsequent years prevented any more failures in 
2. The Middle East and North Africa, 1994, 40th edn., 
Europa Publications Ltd., London, U.K., pp.577-578. 
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Table 3.1 
Different Commodities Produced in Kuwait 
(in 000 metric tons) 
Year 
Commodity 1988 1989 1990 
Wheat flour 147 153 -
Sulphur (by-product) 360 575 400 
Chlorine 14 16 -
Sulphuric acid 5 - -
Caustic soda 
(Sodium hydroxide) 16 18 -
Nitrogenous fertilizers 384.5 386.4 204 
Jet fuels 1 ,460 1,510 1,110 
Motor spirit (petrol) 2 ,430 2,510 1,880 
Napthas 3 ,700 3,800 3,200 
Kerosene 1 ,750 1,890 1,700 
Distillate fuel oils 9 ,180 9,900 7,300 
Residual fuel oils 13 ,462 14,100 12,000 
Petroleum bitumen 
(asphalt) 150 160 110 
Liquefied petroleum gas 2 ,515 2,710 2,410 
Quickline 65 65 50 
Cement 984 1,108 800 
Electric energy 
(million KWh) 19 ,998 20,510 20,610 
Source: UN Industrial Statistics Yearbook, 1991. 
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this sector. About 60% of manufacturing output was 
generated by the public sector with the remainder divided 
equally between the mixed and private sectors. The 
majority of the purely private output came from about 
3,600 very small units typically employing only eight 
persons and engaged in basic manufacturing such as 
textiles, leather goods, clothing (account for 60% of 
private activity), wood products (about 20%), food 
processing and various handicarfts. Manufacturing all but 
stopped during the Iraqi occupation due to shortages of 
inputs and widespread looting of equipment. After 
liberation the sector was hard hit by the departure of 
Palestinian skilled labour which accounted for the 
majority of machinists and mechanics in the country, as 
well as being the owners and operators of many of the 
small manufacturing units involved in textiles and 
carpentry. 
Petrochemicals: 
The first petrochemicals activity in Kuwait was a 
fertilizer operation set up in the late 1960s by PIC, 
which was then a joint venture between the government and 
private interests. Before the Iraqi invasion, the PIC's 
fertilizer division at Shuaiba operated three ammonia 
plants with a capacity of 1 million tons/year and one 
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sulphuric acid plant with a capacity of 792,000 tons/year, 
one ammonium sulphate plant with a 165,000 tons/year 
capacity and one sulphuric acid plant with a capacity of 
132,000 tons/year. PIC also had a salt and chlorine 
division at Shuwaikh producing salt, chlorine, caustic 
soda, hydrochloric acid, sodium hypochlorite, compressed 
hydrogen and distilled water. However with the 
fluctuations in Kuwait's oil production, PIC faced a 
shortage of gas, its principal feedstock and experienced 
considerable difficulties as a result. The increase in oil 
production after 1987 resulted in a revival in the 
petrochemical industry's fortunes, with large increases 
in ammonia and urea output. These two were the only 
significant export products, with domestic sales 
accounting for a negligible portion of sales. There have 
been sporadic exports of sulphuric acid, sodium 
hypochlorite and caustic soda. 
In March 1990 the Kuwaiti government approved plans 
for a major expansion of its petrochemicals industry with 
a proposed $2 billion export oriented plant at Shuaiba. 
The plant was to have been based on 750,000 tons/year 
ethane cracker, and was planned to export ethylene, high 
density polyethylene (HOPE), linear low density 
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polyethylene (LLDPE), monoethyleneglycol, benzene, styrene, 
monomer, paraxylene and orthoxylene. The plans were 
aborted by the Iraqi invasion in August, as was 
construction of a 100,000 tons/year polypropylene plant in 
Shuaiba, on which work had already begun. 
In addition to its petrochemical capacity in the 
country, PIC has interests in a number of other countries, 
apart from its indirect interests through its parent KPC's 
purchase of Sante Fe International and CF Braun in 1981. 
PIC holds 49% of three Tunisian plants: two producing 
phosphatic and compound fertili^rs and a third industrial 
acids. It has 25% of a Turkish plant to produce ammonium 
nitrate and diammonium phosphate using ammonia feedstock 
from Kuwait and phosphoric acid feedstock from PIC's 
Tunisian plant. In addition it has 30% of a joint venture 
in China which is also planned to produce fertilizers 
using feedstock from the Tunisian plants^. 
SAUDI ARABIA: 
The rapid development of Saudi Arabia's non-oil 
industrial sector is a major objective of the whole 
strategy of successive five year plans. Traditional 
3. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, Kuwait, 
1992-93, London, U.K., pp. 20-21. 
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cottage industries such as weaving and mat making as well 
as small-scale enterprises catering for domestic needs 
(tanning, soap making, pottery, furniture, household 
articles) have always existed in Saudi Arabia, but now all 
kinds of value added operations from simple assembly and 
packaging to metal working and building materials 
manufacture are appearing in the kingdom's newly built 
industrial estates, heavy industrial production is almost 
entirely concentrated organizationally in the hands of the 
state owned Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), 
but private sector manufacturing_has—been growing-rapidly 
in scale and range of activities since the late 1970s. By 
1990, 2,251 officially licensed industrial plants were in 
operation, representing a cumulative capital investment of 
SR 100.6 billion. These, together with several thousand of 
unlicensed firms, are producing soft drinks, paper 
products, detergents, furniture, plastics, building 
products and metal and textile manufactures etc. Most 
light industries are centred in Jeddah, Riyadh and Dammam, 
although there are also new industrial estates at Qassim, 
Hofuf, Makkah, Tabuk, Abha, Madinah and Khamis Mushayt. In 
the next five years most manufacturing projects will be 
carried out by the private sector and many may be 
implemented as joint ventures with private or government 
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interests in other Gulf states as the momentum for greater 
economic cooperation in the region grows. Areas where 
industry is expected to grow are the production of 
industrial gases, intermediate petrochemicals, glass 
products, metal products, automative parts, animal feed 
concentrates and agro-industrial products. Overcapacity 
has developed in certain building materials industries and 
the government is offering incentives to manufacturers to 
export. 
The government activdly, supports national- and joint 
venture industrial projects. In March 1974 the Council of 
Ministers endorsed a new industrial policy for Saudi 
Arabia aimed at accelerating the country's economic 
development. The policy provided a wide range of 
incentives - loans, tax exemptions, provision of 
infrastructure and industrial zones - to encourage the 
private sector to carry out projects. The policy is also 
designed to encourage foreign and technology transfer. 
Foreign investors are guaranteed freedom of movement of 
capital in and out of the country. The government set up 
the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) to provide 
interest free, medium and long-term loans to the private 
sector. A Public Investment Fund (PIF), set up in 1971, is 
designed to finance government and semi-government 
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sponsored projects, mostly at the heavy end of the 
industrial spectrum. The government run Saudi Consulting 
House reports on industries that can profitably be 
established in the kingdom, and is constantly refining 
its knowledge of the market for local goods. In 1984 a 
private sector industrial company, the National 
Industrialization Company was established to give more 
substance to the government's efforts to privatize 
industry and to promote industries using feedstock from 
SABIC's first generation projects. Shares in SABIC were 
•also—sold—to thp public. At the same time Saudi Arabia 
launched economic offset programmes in conjunction with 
major defence awards, which seek to ensure that foreign 
suppliers invest 35% of their contract value in high 
technology joint manufacturing ventures based in Saudi 
Arabia. The first of these ventures, in aircraft 
maintenance and electronics, are now operational. 
Jubail and Yanbu; 
The two poles of heavy industrial growth are 
located on opposite sides of the peninsula, at Yanbu on 
the west coast and Jubail on the east. These two 
industrial cities had to be built up from nothing, but by 
1984 heavy industry had commenced operations. The Jubail 
industrial area was designed to encompass 900 sq.km. on 
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the Gulf, about 80 km north of Dammam, with Yanbu covering 
150 sq.km. on the Red Sea, 350 km north of Jeddah. In 
addition to the heavy industries that form the backbone of 
the two cities, there remains considerable scope for 
secondary industries and related service industries. 
Developments at Jubail and Yanbu are overseen by an 
autonomous body, the Royal Commission for Jubail and 
Yanbu. The heavy industrial projects are carried out by 
foreign companies in joint ventures, either with Petromin, 
in the case of export refineries, or with SABIC, in 
case of petrochemic^ls---afl^--slr&eTr'lrri984 SABIC set up two 
petrochemical marketing affiliates, SABIC Marketing 
Company and SABIC Marketing Services Company. All SABIC's 
first generation industries are now producing after a 
highly successful and punctual construction phase, and 
several expansion projects are under way, including the 
construction of two naptha fed ethylene crackers which 
will provide greater feedstock flexibility. Difficulties 
have been encountered in sales to US and EC markets, 
because of protectionism, but the company's annual profits 
4 have been highly impressive nonetheless . 
Table 3.2 gives a list of industrial production 
capacities of SABIC companies. 
4. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, Saudi 
Arabia, 1992-93, London, U.K., pp.26-27. 
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Table 3.2 
Industrial Production and Capacities of SABIC Companies 
(in 000 tons) 
Product Production 
1985 1991 
Capacity 
199ia 1995^ 
Benzene (BTX) 70 
Butadiene - - - 100 
Caustic Soda 181 - 450 450 
Ethanol 204 - 300 300 
Ethylene 1 ,094 - 1,970 2,470 
Ethylene dichloride 224 - 560 560 
Ethylene glycol 245 - 580 910 
Methanol 1 ,246 - 1,97 0 1,97 0 
MTBE - - 500 1,900 
Propylene - - - 300 
Styrene 205 — 360 420 
monomer — — 300 300 
Bulk chemicals 3 ,399 6,980 6,990 9,750 
Melamine 7 - 20 20 
Polyethylene 566 - 870 1,010 
Polypropylene - - - 200 
Polystyrene - - 100 100 
PVC — — 300 300 
Commodity plastics 573 1,450 1,290 1,630 
Ammonia - - 1,000 1,500 
Urea 916 - 1,430 2,030 
Compound 
fertilizers 84 - 810 810 
Fertilizers 1 ,000 2,300 3,240 4,340 
Steel 1 ,017 - 1,740 2,140 
Metals 1 ,017 1,850 1,740 2,140 
Nitrogen 119 - 219 490 
Oxygen 81 - 438 876 
Industrial ^ases 200 560 657 1,366 
Total^ 6 ,189 13,140 13,917 19,226 
Source: Saudi Basic Industries Corporation, Annual Report, 
1985, 1991. 
a : Mid-year 
b : Projections based on current expansion plans 
c : Including production used in downstream processes. 
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Petrochemicals: 
Saudi Arabia is making determined efforts to 
achieve major industrial development, financed mainly by 
government revenues from petroleum under the aegis of 
successive development plans. The cornerstone of the 
industrialization programme is the construction of 
refineries and processing industries to exploit the 
country's huge reserves of petroleum and natural gas. The 
major projects are being undertaken as joint ventures 
between the State and foreign companies. 
The Saudi Arabian Marketing and Refining Company 
(SAMAREC) was formed in 1989 to manage petroleum refining 
and distribution for the Saudi domestic market and to 
handle state exports of refined products. Later in June 
19 93 the government effectively abolished SAMAREC and 
placed its operations under the management of Saudi 
Aramco. Following its absorption of SAMAREC in mid 1993, 
Saudi Aramco took charge of the management of the entire 
range of state petroleum-refining and product-marketing 
interests. As well as handling the marketing of products 
from Saudi Aramco's Ras Tanura plant, SAMAREC had operated 
refineries at Jeddah, Riyadh and Yanbu and had been 
responsible for marketing and state share of output from 
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export oriented refineries at Jubail, Yanbu and Rabigh. 
Saudi Arabia's installed capacity totalled 1,865,000 b/d 
in 1992 an increase of 1 million b/d since 1984. At the 
refineries aggregate throughput level of about 1.5 
million b/d of crude oil in 1992, the volume of refined 
products available for marketing from state channels was 
slightly more than 1 million b/d, of which about 
two-thirds was sold on the home market and the remainder 
exported. 
An impoTlran^^—eleme^ of Saudi Arabia's overall 
product marketing strategy for the ts— 
acquisition by Saudi Aramco of refining interests in 
petroleum importing countries. In November 1988 Saudi 
Aramco entered into a joint venture with Texaco, whereby 
it gained access to a refining and marketing network 
spanning 26 states in the southern and eastern USA. In 
1991 Saudi Aramco acquired a 35% equity interest in South 
Korea's largest refining company, Ssangyong Oil, which had 
265,000 b/d of installed capacity. 
In 1993 Saudi Aramco was actively studying 
proposals for further joint ventures with established 
refiners in Asia, Europe and the USA, with a view to 
raising its effective overseas refining capacity to around 
3 million b/d. There was also a complementary programme to 
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acquire oil storage capacity in major overseas importing 
centres, in furtherance of which Saudi Aramco announced in 
mid-1993 that it was to buy a 34.35% interest in a 17 
million barrel import terminal at the Dutch port of 
Rotterdam. 
In view of Saudi Aramco's emphasis on 'downstream' 
diversification through overseas acquistions, it was 
thought unlikely in mid-1993 that any further domestic 
refineries would be developed in the medium term, although 
domestic demand for refined products was expected to 
continue to grow rapidly under the stimulus of heaviiy-
subsidized consumer prices. In 1991 petroleum- refining 
accounted for 40% of manufacturing output by value with 
petrochemicals worth 22% and other manufactures 38%^. 
BAHRAIN: 
Traditional industries in Bahrain included 
pearling, boatbuilding, fishing and weaving. These have 
practically disappeared since the discovery of oil and 
Bahrain has diversified into a range of other activities. 
Ship repairing and light engineering facilities have been 
established to serve the oil industry but Bahrain also has 
5. References 2, p. 757. 
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a well developed light industry sector producing soft 
drinks, plastics, tiles, air conditioners and other 
articles. An edible oil plant started production in 1991, 
aimed at the domestic and regional markets. Many of these 
new factories are situated in the industrial area 
adjoining the Mina Sulman port. Bahrain has also become a 
centre for integrated Gulf industries such as the GPIC 
methanol and ammonia plant^. 
After independence, the Bahrain government 
recognized that the flow of revenue from the petroleum 
sector would not last far beyond the end of the 20th 
century and Bahrain began a programme of industrial 
diversification. As a result of the collapse of petroleum 
prices in 1986, these industries have become increasingly 
important. To expand industry, Bahrain needed to surmount 
structural disadvantages such as diminishing oil res^ves 
and a shortage of raw materials, apart from gas. The 
government has sought to expand existing industries, 
moving into both primary and secondary activities, 
establishing new ventures, such as a tyre industry, 
increasing inter-industry products and expanding 
production in the consumer goods sector. The main problem 
has been, and remains, the financing of such projects. 
6. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, Bahrain 
and Qatar, 1992-93, London, U.K., p. 13. 
103 
This has been greatly aggravated by the effects of the 
1990-91 Gulf crisis. In 1989, $2,600 million was allocated 
to industrial projects for the period 1989-94. After the 
war between Iraq and the multinational force, however, 
only $700 million was pledged over the next two years. 
Important projects remain suspended and other GCC member 
states seem unlikely to supply the capital necessary for 
their resumption. 
In 1969 the government formed a consortium with 
British, Swedish, French and US companies, to construct 
and operate an aluminium smelter with a capacity of 
120,000 metric tons per year. A new company. Aluminium 
Bahrain (ALBA) began production in 1972 and the government 
took a 57.9% share in 1975. The smelter's annual capacity 
had been expanded to 170,000 tons by 1981. Production at 
the plant increased from 171,454 tons in 1982 to 178,194 
tons in 1986. The depressed state of the world aluminium 
market', in the mid-1980s led to some uncertainity over 
future developments at ALBA and in 1985 plans for further 
expansion were cancelled. In 1986, however prices and 
production rose dramatically and in 1987 ALBA produced 
180,344 tons. In 1988 182,804 tons were produced and the 
company made record profits. In 1989/ 186,395 tons were 
produced. Output rose by 14% in 1990 to 212,505 tons. 
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7 ,505 tons more than rated capacity, after 76 new cells 
were brought into operation- In May 1989 a $1,400 million 
project to increase smelting capacity by more than 100% to 
460,000 tons per year by 1992 (making smelter the world's 
largest) was approved. Revenues which amounted to $269 
million in 1989 were expected to double as a result of 
expansion. The financing of the project was largely 
secured prior to 1990-91 Gulf crisis. The only other 
working aluminium smelter in the Gulf region is operated 
by Dubai Aluminium in the United Arab Emirates and has an 
annual production capacity of 170,000 tons. However, in 
1992 Iran began to construct a smelter of its own. ALBA 
operates as a cost centre, delivering at cost to its 
shareholders, who purchase its production on an agreed 
quota basis. The Bahrain Saudi Aluminium Marketing Company 
(BALCO), which is responsible for marketing the Bahraini 
and Saudi Arabian governments' share of ALBA's production, 
sold 209,800 tons of aluminium products .in 1990 of which 
65% were purchased by member states of the GCC. BALCO 
expects to sell 50,000 tons per annum of wheel alloy after 
completion of its smelter expansion project. 
Five major secondary enterprises related to 
aluminium now exist in Bahrain and in 1986 local companies 
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took 25% of ALBA's total production. The International 
Bahrain Aluminium Atomizer Company began production in 
1972 with 51% government ownership and in 1983 it produced 
3,450 tons of aluminium power, the state-owned Bahrain 
Aluminium Extrusion Company IBALEXCO) innaugurated in 1977 
produces aluminium rods for domestic and foreign markets. 
In January 1991 BALEXCO formally became a joint-stock 
company following the government's reduction of its 
shareholding to 80%. However, the process of privatization 
was hindered by the Gulf crisis in 1990-91. BALEXCO lost 
BD 1.5 million - BD 2 million worth of orders from Kuwait 
and its privatization share issue was not fully 
subscribed. In mid-1991 the Gulf Aluminium Industries 
Company (GALCO) was established as a joint venture between 
BALEXCO and Finleader of Italy in order to take advantage 
of the increase of production at ALBA. Middle East 
Aluminium Cable Ltd. (Midal Cables) is a private company, 
established in 1978 with a target output of 15,000 tons of 
aluminium cables per year. A rod mill was added to the 
plant in 1985, increasing capacity by 75% and in 1986 the 
Saudi Cable Company increased its share in Midal to 50% 
with the remaining 50% being held by the Zayani 
Investments Group. In January 1986 the Gulf Aluminium 
Rolling Company (GARMCO) established under the auspices of 
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the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting (GOIC) 
began production at its $100 million plant at Sitra. Its 
hot mill has an annual production capacity of 120,000 
tons. In 1986, its first full year of production GARMCO 
produced 30,000 tons of rolled aluminium and in 1988 
output increased to 55,000 tons. In 1989 50,000 tons of 
rolled aluminium were produced. In 1991 Bahrain's new 
investment policy attracted an aluminium wheel 
manufacturing company, Aluwheel to the island. The company 
is a $32 million joint venture between Al-Zayani 
Investments and BBS Kraftfahrzeugtechnik of Germany. Its 
new factory has an initial target capacity of 500,000 
vehicle wheels per year which is expected to increase to 
1.5 million wheels. 
The Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard (ASRY) 
Company's dry dock, financed by the members of the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) 
was opened in 1977 . It has a capacity of 450,000 dwt. The 
decline in oil markets and in world shipping led to severe 
problems for the company and in 1983 revenues totalled 
only $13.3 million, compared with $31 million in 1982. 
Nevertheless, in 1984 ASRY received renewed financial 
support from the OAPEC countries and revenues rose 
slightly to $16.6 million. In 1985 ASRY's occupancy rate 
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was 83% and its operating costs were $27 million. In 1987 
ASRY's occupancy rate rose as a result of an increase in 
demand (caused by attacks on shipping in the Gulf) and 
revenues amounted to $22 million compared with $11.3 
million in 1986. ASRY's losses in 1985 were estimated at 
$10 million and in 1986 they were about $8 million. The 
company's accounts showed its first full-year profits in 
1987. ASRY's profits declined to approximately $1,5 
million in 1990, compared with a record $9 million in 
1989. Plans to build a second dry dock, with a capacity of 
180,000 dwt were suspended in August 1990. ASRY renewed 
its plans in March 1991 and intended to install a second-
hand floating dock upto 100,000 dwt capacity in the near 
future with the construction of the dry dock to begin 
after the floating dock is in place. In the first half of 
1992 ASRY achieved record revenues of $30 million. The 
Bahrain Ship Repairing and Maintenance Company, which 
specializes in smaller - scales ship repairs made a profit 
of $11.9 million in 1990, 3.2% lower than in 1989. 
In 1981 the Bahrain Government attempted further to 
diversify the economy by forming the Arab Iron and Steel 
Company (AISCO), with shareholders from Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The company 
opened the Gulf's first iron-pelletizing plant in 
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December 1984 with a capacity of 4 million tons per year. 
Total production in 1985, AISCO's first full year of 
operation reached 680,000 tons. However, AISCO recorded a 
financial loss of $31.6 million in 1986, representing a 
deficit of $20 million greater than that incurred in 1985. 
In March 1988 the sale of AISCO to a newly-formed 
subsidiary of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC), the 
Gulf Industrial Investment Company was agreed. 
In 1985 the Gulf Acid Industries Company began 
production of sulphuric acid and distilled water. Light 
industry, including the production of supplementary gas 
supplies, asphalt, pre-fabricated buildings, plastics, soft 
drinks, air-conditioning equipment and paper products also 
cotinued to develop during 1986. In 1987 the government 
imposed a 20% tariff on completing imported goods for a 
trial period of 12 months, as part of a programme to 
support the expansion of light industry. In 1987 Wires 
International became the first Bahraini company to export 
an industrial product, aluminium fly mesh to the Far East. 
In 1988 the Government announced plans to increase import 
substitution to a level of 30% with guaranteed state 
protection of markets. In 1989 Bahrain Berger Paints, in a 
joint venture with United Breweries of India announced a 
109 
new $3,000 million project for a pharmaceuticals plant, 
the first of its kind in Bahrain, Further joint ventures 
were envisaged in aluminium, petrochemicals, health-care 
and computer software. An extra $3,000 million was 
allocated in 1989 for the expansion of oil, gas and 
aluminium production facilities. 
Industrial expansion and population growth have 
necessitated an increase in the provision of electricity 
and water. Bahrain's first power station began production 
in" 1931 and by the early 1980s there were major power 
stations at al-Mahouz, al-Muharraq, Sitra and Rifa'a with 
a combined generating capacity of 992 MW. After the war to 
liberate Kuwait ended in February 1991, plans for an 
increase in electricity supplies were activated. The 
refurbishment of Sitra power station in order to increase 
its life expectancy, was begun, and bids were tendered for 
a 200 km link between the 800 MW Alba power station and 
the national grid. The government has tended to 
concentrate on the combined production of power and water 
and the first multi-stage flash desalination project at 
Sitra was completed in 1976, with two units producing 
5 million gallons per day. Water consumption rose by more 
than 50% between 1979 and 1983 and in order to meet rising 
demand the Government planned the further expansion of 
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desalination units at Sitra. One such unit with a capacity 
of 5 million gallons per day came into operation in 1985. 
In 1984 contracts were exchanged for the construction of a 
reverse osmosis plant with a capacity of 10 million 
gallons per day at ad-Dir. It was intended that this plant 
should provide water for 22% of Bahrain's population. In 
November 1989 a $380 million programme to expand water 
desalination by 30 million gallons per day and electric 
capacity by 180 MW was approved. In early 1991 it was 
announced that two 15 million gallons per day sea water 
desalination plants at Manama and Muharraq were to be 
built. By 1986 Bahrain's total daily output of desalinated 
water was 35 million gallons, sufficient to meet only 68% 
of the country's daily water consumption and in 1987 
average consumption rose to 54.3 million gallons. In 
February 1991 it was decided that emergency measures 
should be taken to protect Bahrain against the Gulf's 
largest ever oil spillage. Booms were installed at 
Bahrain's main desalination plant at Sitra to protect its 
25 million gallons per day sea water intake. Power demand 
was increasing in the early 1990s at a rate of 6% per 
year: in 1987 total demand was 630 MW and this was 
expected to increase to 1,110 MW by 1997. In early 1993 
Ill 
British gas signed an agreement with private sector 
Bahraini companies to develop and operate a new power 
station at an estimated cost of US $725 million^. 
QATAR: 
Qatar commenced development of heavy industry ahead 
of some of its neighbours. In 1973 it set up the 
Industrial Development Technical Centre (IDTC) to 
coordinate the development of non-oil related industry and 
handle detailed industrial planning. Efforts to diversify 
the economic base away from oil were given additional 
momentum by the mid-1989 decision to split the Ministry of 
Industry and Agriculture into two seperate portfolios. The 
new industry and public works ministry took over the 
responsibilities of the IDTC (which was dissolved) and has 
adopted a policy of actively promoting heavy industrial 
ventures supplied by North Field gas. Although a 
memorandum of understanding was signed in mid-1989 to 
establish a 200,000 tons/d capacity aluminium smelter in 
Qatar, little firm progress has been made on establishing 
the project. More recent proposals have included a 500,000 
7. Reference 2, pp. 291-292. 
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tons/year capacity methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) and 
methanol plant and an export oriented gypsum factory. The 
government is encouraging the private sector to develop 
light industry while it assumes responsibility for major 
heavy industrial ventures. With the authorities 
anticipating the full take-up of sites at the Umm Said 
industrial zone, longer term plans foresee the setting up 
of a second industrial zone at Ras Qirtas. 
Petrochemicals t 
The Qatar Petrochemicals Company (Qapco), Qatar 
General Petroleum Corporation (QGPC) and CdF Chimie 
cooperated in setting up a petrochemicals plant in Qatar 
itself; this was commissioned in 1980 with a capacity of 
280,000 tons/year of ethylene, 140,000 tons/year of low 
density polyethylene and 46,000 tons/year of sulphur. The 
plant has suffered from shortages of gas feedstocks since 
1981. Qapco losses have risen as problems over feedstock 
and prices have mounted. In August 1990 the company's 
share structure was altered with France's Atochem and 
Italy's Enichem each acquiring a 10% stake in Qapco and 
QGPC retaining the remaining 80%. Both companies have 
agreed to participate in Qapco's plans to double ethylene 
and LDPE capacity to 600,000 tons/year and 360,000 
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tons/year respectively, over half Qapco's output is now 
sold in the Middle East region and India and the rest to 
J&pan and South East Asia. 
Dukhan gas also fuels the Umm Said fertilizer plant 
run by the Qatar Fertilizer Company (Qafco) which 
commenced production in 1973. QGPC owns 75% of the 
company's shares with Norsk Hydro owning the remaining 25% 
and providing management and export marketing. A parallel 
plant, which doubled capacity to 1,800 tons/d of ammonia 
and 2,000 tons/d of urea was completed at the end of 1979, 
Total production rose steadily in the first half of the 
1980s but has fallen back in recent years. In 1990 Qafco 
produced 708,000 tons of ammonia (well down on record 
production of 744,000 tons in 1985) and 761,000 tons of 
urea compared with 714,073 tons and 778,561 tons 
respectively in 1989. India and China • are the principal 
markets for Qafco's output. A total of 240,000 tons of 
ammonia and 854,000 tons of urea were exported in 1990. 
Qafco plans to increase production capacity by l,000tons/d 
of ammonia and 2,000tons/d of urea. 
Other Industries: 
The integrated steel complex run by the Qatar Steel 
Company (Qasco) began production in 1978. It is 70% owned 
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by the government, 20% by Kobe Steel of Japan and 10% by 
Tokyo Boeki. It was the first complex of its kind in the 
Gulf to use natural gas in the conversion of iron ore into 
sponge iron. Output of reinforced steel bars totalled a 
record 565,000 tons in 1990, more than 70% above design 
capacity. In 1988 the company claimed to have recorded its 
first annual profit since it started operations and 
profits were reported to have risen to QR 170 million 
($47 million) in 1989. However, lower world steel prices 
are likely to have depressed 1990 results. At the start of 
1988 Qasco took over full management of the steel mill 
from Kobe Steel. 
The Qatar National Company factory at Umm Bab on 
the west coast has been in operation since 1969 producing 
over 300,000 tons/year. In 1990 production increased by 
10% to 327,000 tons. The privately owned Qatar Flour Mill 
Company began production in 1969. Many other smaller 
industries have been setup, many of which are located at 
Umm Said. IDTC actively promoted the establishment of 
ventures in plastics, canning, battery production and 
electrical accessories and offered considerable technical 
and business support to those prepared to enter these 
fields, including soft loans and exemption from import 
duties. 
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Power and Water: 
Qatar's power needs are supplied by two major power 
stations. One at Ras Abu Aboud has a generating capacity 
of 210 MW and desalination capacity of 11.5 million 
gallons/d of distilled water. Another at Ras Abu Fontas 
came into full operation in 1983 with total generating 
capacity of 1,150 MW and desalination capacity of 48 
million gallons/d. Another power and desalination plant is 
to be built at Wusail, possibly in a public-private sector 
joint venture. When completed, it could provide 1,500 MW 
of power and 100 million gallons/d of water. Work on the 
plant had been delayed by budget constraints but was 
revived at the start of 1990. Desalinated water provides 
the vast majority of Qatar's drinking water and water 
consumption is estimated at around 50 million gallons/d. A 
contract to build a new 4 million gallon concrete water 
reservoir and to revamp four existing ones was awarded in 
late 1990, while several other water infrastructure 
g 
improvement projects are under negotiation . 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 
The UAE government has attached prime importance to 
the development of suitable industries as a means of 
8. Reference 6, pp. 30-32. 
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deversifying the country's economic base and reducing 
dependence on the export of oil. Both Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
embarked on major industrial projects during the 1970s but 
development suffers from the lack of overall federal 
direction. 
The Ruwais Industrial Zone; 
Abu Dhabi has concentrated on downstream 
developments in the oil sector at the Ruwais Industrial 
Zone, east of Jebel Dhanna oil export terminal. The 
original master plan for this zone envisaged the 
construction of a port, a gas gathering and fractionation 
plant, a refinery, fertilizer plant, steel mill, 
petrochemical plant, hotel and related infrastructure with 
a city to accomodate upto 80,000 people by 1980. This 
project was subsequently scaled down. The Gasco fractiona-
tion plant was followed by the Ruwais Fertilizer 
Industries plant (Fertil), which came on stream in late 
1983; its current capacity is 550,OOutons/year of urea and 
330,000 tons/year of ammonia sold mainly to India and 
China, although this is to be increased by 20%. A sulphur 
exporting terminal was added to Ruwais in 1984. Outside 
Ruwais, Abu Dhabi produces cement at Al-Ain, together with 
cement bags, steel pipes, flour and bricks. There is a 
small industrial zone at Mussafa, outside Abu Dhabi city. 
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Jebel Ali and the dry dock: 
Initially, the two focal points of industrailiza-
tion in Dubai were the Dubai Aluminium smelter (Dubai) and 
the Dugas processing plant at Jebel Ali, 35 km south west 
of Dubai city. These started operations in 1980. Since 
1991 Dubai has had a capacity of 246,000 tons/year and in 
1991 production amounted to 239,030 tons. Dugas completed 
a major expansion scheme in 1985 which increased its 
capacity by about one third. This also coincided with the 
rise of another major pro:iect - the Jebel Ali Free Zone 
{JAFZ) . 
Launched in April 1985, JAFZ is designed to attract 
multinationals to set up factories and warehouses for 
goods that can be exported to Asia, Africa and other 
Middle East countries. It has attracted investment well in 
excess of $600 million and the zone exceeded expectations 
in 1989 and early 1990 in terms of gaining major new 
business. Over 400 companies have taken up leases using 
JAFZ as a distribution or manufacturing centre- These 
include Japan's Sony Corporation, Union Carbide, BP Bulk 
Lubricants, Mc Dermotts, Cleveland Bridge, BICC and Hunter 
Foods. In 1992 Dubai passed a law enabling the 
incorporation of free zone establishments (FZEs) in Jebel 
Ali; these will have a distinct legal identity from their 
foreign shareholders and en^oy limited liability. 
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Sharjah: 
Sharjah's industrial potential was initially 
enhanced by the discovery of the Sajaa gas/condensate 
field and various downstream projects have been discussed 
over the years including, most recently, a possible 
fertilizer joint venture with an Indian concern. Other 
suggestions have fallen foul of poor markets and lack of 
finance. Sharjah has also attracted a number of garment 
factories as well as other light industry. 
Duplication and the Emirates Industrial Bank; 
Although government involvement is much in evidence 
at emirate level in most heavy industry, the development 
of capacity in the cement, steel rolling, plastics and 
food industries has been left in the main to the private 
sector. Industrial licences have been granted by 
individual emirates with scant regard for developments 
taking place in their neighbours within the federation. As 
was the case with much government sponsored industrial 
construction throughout the Gulf in the 1970s, lack of 
experience and lack of planning, combined with ample funds 
but limited natural resources allowed projects to mushroom 
with little concern about duplication or over capacity. 
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Cement is the prime example. The UAE has eight 
cement factories - three in Ras al-Khaimah ^one producing 
white cement) and one in each of the other emirats (except 
Umm al-Qaiwain) - with a total capacity of around 7 
million tons/year). Local demand for cement was estimated 
at less than 2 million tons in 1986, but discussions 
between the emirates on how to rationalize production made 
little progress. A drastic solution was found for the 
country's five steel rolling mills: three have closed down 
and the remaining two are said to be doing well. 
Factories producing plastic pipes and other plastic 
products, based mainly in Dubai and Sharjah, were hoping 
to export their output because the domestic market 
appeared saturated. 
The Emirates Industrial Bank launched as a federal 
venture (51% owned by the Ministry of Finance and the 
remainder shared among insurance companies and banks) in 
1983 is gradually imposing a sense of discipline on the 
9 
industrial scene . 
OMAN: 
Oman's traditional industries were crafts such as 
silver working, shipbuilding and weaving. New 
9. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, 1992-93 
UAE, London, U.K., pp. 21-22. 
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manufacturing industries have grown only slowly and 
still account for less than 4% of GDP although the 
average annual growth rate during the 1980s was 
impressive. The main constraints on development have 
been the small internal market and free import 
competition. Those industries which now exist are 
small to medium scale, with the exception of heavy 
extraction and refining industries (oil and copper) in 
the public sector. 
To encourage small enterprises the government 
offers soft loans, cheap land and electricity, import 
duty exemptions and government sponsored feasibility 
studies. National industrial development and trade 
exchange is also being supported by the GCC. The 
government through the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries Wealth has also funded agro-industries such 
as the Nizwa and Rustaq date plants and the Salalah 
banana packing plant. It is attempting to spread 
development by offering incentives for investment 
outside the capital area. 
During 1990 1,232 new industrial establishments 
were registered, bringing the total to 5,531 by the 
end of the year. The majority of these manufacture 
non-metallic mineral products, followed by wood and 
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wood products and fabricated metal products. Factories 
producing asbestos cement pipes, electric wire and cable, 
paper bags, concrete blocks, detergents, edible oils and 
perfume have been established and others are under design 
or construction as part of the Rusail industrial estate 
development. The Rusail industrial estate near Muscat is 
central to government industry plans. It comprises 90 
hectares divided into 77 commercial plots with a good 
services infrastructure. Expansion to 150 plots is under 
way. At the end of 1990 the estate had 41 working 
factories. A future four such industrial estates are 
planned in Raysut (Dhofar), Sohar, Sur and Nizwa. Much of 
the labour is expatriate. 
The second and third five year plans gave 
considerable encouragement for the private sector to 
become involved in industry, in both large and medium 
sized projects, particularly where raw materials of local 
origin could be utilized. In addition the third plan 
stressed the importance of foreign investment, production 
for export and of industries which could use a higher 
proportion of Omani labour. Two of the larger projects to 
come on stream were cement factories: the 210,000 ton 
cement factory at Raysut near Salalah - using locally 
quarried limestone and gypsum - and the 620,000 ton plant 
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at Rusail. Whereas the Raysut works is only 20% government 
owned, the Rusail plant, the Oman Cement Company is 
wholly government owned. An earlier venture, the Oman 
Flour Mills operation at Matrah and associated grain silos 
at Mina Qaboos spawned an animal feed mill to provide a 
range of pelletized feedstuff for all animal types. Oman 
Flour Mills subsequently doubled daily flour production to 
3,000 tons^°.* 
10. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, 1992-93, 
Oman, London, U.K., p. 22. 
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Although the GCC appears to have been formed 
primarily in response to preoccupations peculiar to the 
Gulf subregion, its implications for economic cooperation 
in Western Asia and in the wider Arab context, cannot be 
overemphasized. The GCC member states wield substantial 
economic and financial power arising from their role as 
aid donors and markets for goods, services and labour. To 
that extent their economic policies can have considerable 
impact on other countries in the region. Moreover, the 
Council represents a new and unique experiment in Arab 
economic cooperation, being the first multinational 
arrangement conceived outside the framework of League of 
Arab States, the Council of Arab Economic Unity and their 
affiliated institutions. 
A number of features associated with the GCC augur 
well for the future. First, the states which are members 
of the Council share a number of characteristics and 
concerns favouring closer cooperation, including socio-
cultural homogeneity, similarity in political and economic 
systems and geographical proximity. They also maintain 
strong links with, and are excessively dependent on the 
international economy. Second, the establishment of the 
Council follows more than three decades of efforts to 
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forge closer economic relations among the Arab countries. 
There has also been a number of moves at the level of the 
Gulf subregion itself which have contributed to paving the 
way for setting up the Council, such as the establishment 
of the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting and 
various sectoral coordination and consultative 
conferences. The experience acquired in the working of 
several Gulf 3oint ventures should also prove useful. 
Third/ the GCC appears to have opted for a gradualist 
approach in which the key elements are coordination and 
harmonization, as against the traditionally ambitious and 
comprehensive approaches proposed in the broader context 
of Arab integration efforts. At the same time, the 
organizational structure of the GCC comprises features, 
such as the Supreme Council at the level of heads of 
state, meeting twice a year, which should be helpful in 
ironing out differences in views and in effectively 
implementing decisions. Fourth, the members seem to be 
aware of the adverse effects of a polarization of benefits 
in favour of the economically stronger partners, as 
reflected in the decision to accord preference to Bahrain 
and Oman when locating intergovernmental joint ventures in 
the field of oil, oil derivatives and ferrous metals^. 
1. United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia, 
Economic Integration in Western Asia, Frances Pinter, 
London, 1985, p. 231. 
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Lastly, the overall availability of financial resources 
should make it easier for the GCC to overcome possible 
friction and divergence of interests among its members 
and/or losses resulting from the integration process. 
The importance of the economic dimensions, relative 
to the political one, in the activities of the GCC, as 
well as the kind of relations that will evolve with other 
countries in the region, especially those which were 
active on the Gulf scene prior to the formation of the 
Council, can be important for its success and acceptance 
as an integrative vehicle in the wider Arab context. 
Apprehensions in this respect relate to the possible 
weakening of resolve for, and interest in, wider 
cooperative endeavours and/or the weakening of support for 
existing institutions .and undertakings the scope of which 
extends beyond the Gulf subregion. 
Economic Development in Member Countries: 
KUWAIT: 
The 1990-95 Five Year Plan represents a 
comprehensive strategy covering all sectors of the 
economy, the main features of which are keeping GDP' s 
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growth at an annual rate of 3.9% accelerating growth in 
2 
the non-oil sectors and holding 'down public expenditure . 
The plan is a flexible document but the most serious 
changes that imposed themselves during the course of its 
development were the unexpected escalation of the Gulf war 
and the collapse in oil prices and their impact on a 
number of aspects, specially finance. 
To this could be added the dent in investment 
income which will result from the turbulence in world 
equity markets in late 1987 . A feature of the past has 
been the strong performance of the investment sector, 
which enabled an increase of 24% in the late 1986 current 
account surplus compared with the previous year. Again 
leading Kuwaiti bankers take a sanguine view of prospects, 
suggesting that the economic: value of oil argues for price 
stabilization around the $20 a barrel mark. Dependence on 
crude oil sales is only one leg of a stool. More than 50% 
of Kuwait's oil production is refined in Kuwait and a 
number of hydrocarbons related industries have been 
established in fertilizers and petrochemicals, making use 
of cheap gas feedstock in the non-oil sector, where much 
of the hope for the future lies^. 
2. MEED, Kuwait Special Report, Vol. 32, No. 5, 30 
January-5 February, 1988 , p. 3. 
3. Ibid. 
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Despite the non-interventionist policies of 
the government in regard to industry, a number of 
financial and administrative incentives exist to encourage 
Kuwaiti businessmen interested in manufacturing. A glance 
round the well stocked shelves at one of Kuwait's American 
style supermarkets reveals a plethora of imported 
products. With the exception of locally produced dairy 
products, paper tissues and mineral water, there is little 
from Kuwait, although Saudi Arabia is well represented in 
frozen foods from a factory in Jubail. This may be about 
to change as market gardening has received a boost in 
Kuwait and first export consignment of cucumbers-nine 
tonnes in all - was delivered to Bahrain in November 1987. 
Kuwaiti industrialists can get long term loans, low 
cost utilities, tax exemptions and tariff protection. In 
1986 the Ministry of Commerce and Industry reviewed the 
tariff system which provides for protection levels ranging 
from 15% to 25%, but on a case by case basis. Tariffs are 
reviewed periodically and in no way provide a charter for 
lame duck industries. Indeed Kuwait itself is opening to 
manufacturers of products from other GCC countries, with 
among others the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, 
the oldest Arab aid agency, specifying in some cases the 
use of GCC sourced materials on certain projects. 
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An analysis of oil revenue data (see Table 1.2 in 
chapter 1) reveals that from 1970-1992, petroleum export 
revenues have accounted for 91.7% of total exports and are 
the source of bulk revenues for the country. This clearly 
implies lack of diversity of the economy. Kuwait paid dear 
for this dependence when export earnings of the petroleum 
sector in particular and that of the total exports in 
general fell by 25% and 29.5% respectively during the oil 
price crash in 1986. However, even during this lean period 
of oil markets, the petroleum exports contributed 99.7% to 
the total exports of the economy. Conscious of the 
vulnerability of the economy, efforts have been made to 
diversify. This is proved by the point that the percentage 
of petroleum export revenues has lessened from 1986 
onwards except for the year 1988. 
From 1984 upto 1993 the contribution of mining and 
quarrying sector which mainly constitutes oil and gas 
sector has been below the 1984 level i.e. 52.8% but it has 
oscillated. In 1988 it was 28.9% below by 8.1% from its 
previous level of 37% in 1987 becuase of the decline in 
oil price by 23.4%. In 1989 it rose to 39% and there was 
an increase of 20.7% in oil prices. In 1990 it declined to 
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37.7% though there was an increase in price by 13.3%. That 
year the petroleum export revenues also declined by 40.5%. 
This suggests that there was a downfall in production. In 
1991 the contribution of oil sector to GDP further 
declined to 14% and in 1992 it rose to 42.7%. For the 
period 1984-1993, the average percentage contribution of 
oil sector is highest. It is 37%. 
The above analysis suggests that how vulnerable an 
economy is to exogeneous and endogeneous pressures if it 
has a single lead sector in its economy on which its GDP 
depends to a significant proportion. This also points to 
the necessity for the diversification of the economy. 
The largest non-oil sector has been community, 
social and personal services, it ranks second as regards 
contribution to GDP (see Table 4.3). Its average 
percentage contribution to the GDP for the period 
1984-1993 has been 22.9%. This is a positive symptom as an 
economy is said to be in a strong position if the service 
sector records a higher contribution to GDP. But there is 
a paradox as the contribution to gauge the health of the 
economy is in the following order, highest contribution 
from services sector, then from secondary and the least 
from primary. The above is the position of a stable 
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healthy economy. But here the maximum contribution is from 
the primary sector and then from services. Manufacturing 
does not come anywhere in between the two and so a 
paradox. 
In the order of hierarchy, the third largest 
contributor to GDP is the real estate and business 
services sector. Its average percentage share over the 
period 1984-1993 is 11%. An interesting feature is that 
construction sector should have been somewhere close to 
real estate sector because contruction and real estate 
go hand in hand. But it ranks seventh with an average 
percentage contribution for the period 1984-1993 for mere 3.1%. 
This implies that in the real estate and business services 
sector the major contribution is of that of business 
services and.not of real estate. 
Manufacturing has been another major contributor, 
its average contribution to the GDP for the period 
1984-1993 has been 10.7%. But this has to be looked a bit 
cautiously as manufacturing includes hydrocarbon based 
downstream operatios and manufacturing in this case mainly 
entails hydrocarbon based industries. 
The next sector to contribute to the GDP is 
wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels followed 
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by some other service sectors. In fact the ESCWA data 
which is being followed over here has classified various 
service sectors. It has also included various services, 
mining, quarrying and agriculture in industries. Otherwise 
if all the services are taken together, a much higher 
percentage contribution of services sector to the GDP 
shall be registered. 
Contribution of agriculture, forestry and hunting 
to the GDP is very low. Its average percentage 
contribution for the period 1984-1993 is just 0.4%. 
Finally, the contribution of electricity, gas and 
water is minimum. In fact it is negative. For the period 
1984-1993, average percentage contribution of this sector 
to the GDP is -1.3%. "Electricity and water prices are 
4 
heavily subsidised" . One of the reasons why the 
contribution of electricity, gas and water is negative is 
that it is subsidised. 
SADDI ARABIA: 
Economic development in Saudi Arabia has been 
carried out since 1970 along the lines of five year plans, 
which set physical infrastructural targets and provide an 
overall spending framework. The fifth five year plan 
started in 1990. 
4. MEED Kuwait Special Report, Vol. 38, No. 8, 25 
February 1994, p. 9. 
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Table 4.11 
Average Percentage Contribution of Different Sectors of 
Kuwait to GDP (1984-1993) 
Sectors Percentage 
contribution 
Ranks 
Mining & quarrying 37.0 1 
Community, social & 
personal services 22.9 2 
Real estate & business 
services 11.0 3 
Manufacturing 10.7 4 
Wholesale & reatil trade, 
restaurants & hotels 9.9 5 
Transport, storage & 
communication 3.8 6 
Construction 3.1 7 
Financial institutions & 
insurance 2.8 8 
Less: imputed bank service 
charges 1.7 9 
Import duties 0.8 10 
Agriculture, forestry & hunting 0.4 11 
Electricity, gas & water -1.3 12 
Source: Computed on the basis of computations made in 
Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.11 
Crude Oil Prices in Kuwait (1970-1992) 
(US Dollars per barrel) 
Year Price of Kuwait Export ? i Change in Prices 
1970 1.68 -
1971 2.08 + 23.8 
1972 2.37 +13.9 
1973 4.90 +106.7 
1974 11.54 +135.5 
1975 11.30 -2.0 
1976 11.23 -0.6 
1977 12.37 + 10.1 
1978 12.27 -0.8 
1979 25.50 +107.8 
1980 31.50 + 23.5 
1981 33.00 +4.7 
1982 32.30 -2.1 
1983 27.30 -15.4 
1984 - -
1985 27.30 -
1986 - -
1987 16.48 -
1988 12.61 -23.4 
1989 15.23 +20.7 
1990 17.27 +13.3 
1991 - -
1992 17.50 -
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin ,1987'& 1992, OPEC, Vienna 
Austria,pp. 123, 117. 
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The second development plan (1975-80) had the 
following goals: to assure the defence and internal 
security of the kingdom; to maintain a high rate of 
economic growth; to reduce dependence on oil; to 
develop indigeneous human resources; to raise the 
standard of living; and to develop the physical 
infrastructure. The Third and Fourth Plans maintained 
these central goals, but elaborated on certain 
specifics. The third plan, for instance, placed 
particular emphasis on restraining growth of the 
expatriate labour force and on promoting growth in 
agriculture, industry and mining. The Fourth Plan 
(1985-90) introduced the theme of efficiency and 
productivity more strongly than previously, promoted 
economic and social integration within the GCC, 
reinforced the desirability of reducing the foreign 
labour force, underlined the importance of the private 
sector in all sectors of the economy and stressed the 
need for a return to fiscal balance. Due to the 
anticipated greater involvement of the private sector 
in economic development during the fourth plan and 
because the kingdom's basic infrastructure is 
substnatially complete, the plan adopted a new 
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methodology that concentrated on programmes and policies 
rather than specific projects and targets. 
The current Fifth Plan (1990-95) follows a similar 
pattern, setting a limited number of broad targets for all 
sectors, which include expansion of education and health 
services, development of new roads, telephone lines and 
municipal water networks, expansion of electricity 
generating capacity by 25% and growth in agricultural 
production and the number of factories. Despite 
considerable stress on the role of the private sector, 
there are no new specific proposals for privatization; 
indeed government appears to be backtracking on 
privatising industries where substantial new investment is 
required (e.g. telephones) or where private sector 
management might lead to a challenge to the kingdom's 
elaborate system of income distribution via cross 
subsidization. A new feature of the plan is the indication 
that state companies are to begin raising their own 
investment funds independent of the central budget. Of 
total new investment worth over SR 386 billion, as 
provided for in the current plan, approximately SR 151 
billion is due to be provided by the central budget, SR35 
billion by specialised credit institutions, SR 57 billion 
by state companies and SR 144 billion by the private 
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sector.^ 
For the period 1970-1992, the petroleum export 
revenues have accounted for 94.7% of the total export 
revenues (see Table 1.3 in chapter 1). This shows the 
heavy reliance of the economy on proceeds from petroleum. 
This points to the marginal position of other sectors in 
the economy. As in the case of other oil exporting 
countries, Saudi Arabia had to pay dear for this 
dependence during the oil price crash of 1986, when the 
export earnings of the petroleum sector in particular and 
that of the total exports in general fell by 25.3% and 
26.5% respectively. Nonetheless, even during such 
depressed conditions, the petroleum exports contributed 
89.51 to the total exports of the economy. As stated 
earlier in the five year plans there has been a goal to 
lessen dependence on the oil sector. Accordingly the 
petroleum export revenues as percentage of total export 
revenues have been less than the previous years from 1986 
onwards. 
The average percentage contribution of minining and 
quarrying sector which mainly comprises of oil and gas for 
the period 1984-1993 is 30% to the GDP and ranks first. 
5. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, Saudi 
Arabia, 1992-1993, London, U.K., p.12. 
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For this period the relationship between oil prices and 
oil export revenues is erratic. 
The largest non-oil sector to contribute to the GDP 
is producers of government services. Its average 
percentage contribution for the period 1989-1993 is 18.6% 
and ranks second. Again as in the case of Kuwait the 
sector to rank second is from the services. 
The third contributor to GDP is construction, its 
average percentage contribution to GDP for the period 
1984-1993 is 10.5%. But real estate and business services 
rank very low. This implies that the share of business 
service is very low. 
Manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade and 
restaurants are yet another significant contributor to the 
GDP. Their average percentage contribution for the period 
1984-1993 is 7.6%. 
Agriculture, forestry and hunting contributes 6.1% 
to the GDP for the period 1984-1993. But this would have 
figured much lower had different services been clubbed at 
one place. 
Electricity, gas and water contributes the least to 
the GDP. Its contribution for the period is only 0.1%. 
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This is so because this sector is heavily subsidised by 
the government. 
BAHRAIN: 
Bahrain was one of the richest areas in the 
northern Gulf prior to the discovery of oil- Its pearls 
were the best in the region and pearling employed nearly 
half the male working population. It was also an important 
agricultural and trading centre. With the disovery of oil 
in 1932, Bahrain became the first state on the Arab-side 
of the Gulf to exploit its hydrocarbon resources. However, 
because it has very limited oil reserves Bahrain was 
forced at an earlier stage than the other Gulf sheikhdoms 
to diversify its economic base. Hence, even now its 
economy is more developed and complex than those of its 
wealthier neighbours. Nevertheless, although the oil 
sector contributes only about one eighthof GDP, oil sales 
provide over 60% of government revenues and are therefore 
of great significance in an economy where public 
expenditure is a powerful force. 
In addition Bahrain is acutely sensitive to 
regional instability. With the v;idening of the Iran-Iraq 
conflict in the mid 1980s, the non-oil sectors of the 
economy entered a period of uncertainity and malaise. 
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Table 4.11 
Average Percentage Contribution of Different Sectors of 
Saudi Arabia to GDP (1984-1993) 
Sectors Percentage 
contribution 
Ranks 
Mining & quarrying 30.0 1 
Producers of government services 18 .6 2 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Wholesale & retail trade, 
restaurants & hotels 
10.5 
7.6 
7.6 
3 
4 
4 
Transport,-storage & ccxnmunication 7.1 6 
Agriculture, forestry & hunting 6.1 7 
Financial institutions & 
insurance 4.1 8 
Ccmmunity, social & personal 
services 2.8 9 
Real estate & business services 2.2 10 
Import duties 1.6 11 
Electricity, gas & water 0.1 12 
Source: Computed on the basis of computations made in 
Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.11 
Crude Oil Prices in Saudi Arabia (1970-1992) 
(US Dollars per barrel) 
Year Price of Arabian Light % Change in Prices 
1970 - -
1971 2.28 -
1972 2.47 +8.3 
1973 5.17 +109.3 
1974 11.65 +125.3 
1975 12.37 + 6.1 
1976 - -
1977 13.66 -
1978 - -
1979 19.35 -
1980 32.25 + 66.6 
1981 36.55 + 13.3 
1982 - -
1983 30.00 -
1984 - -
1985 - -
1986 - -
1987 17.23 -
1988 13.40 -22.2 
1989 16.21 + 20.9 
1990 20.82 + 28.4 
1991 17.47 -16.0 
1992 17.89 + 2.4 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin / 1987 & 1992, OPBCy Vienna, 
Austria, pp. 127-128. & 116. 
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failing to secure their full investment potential. 
Traditionally Bahrain was an entrepot trade centre and, 
although its importance in this sphere declined with the 
development of mainland, particularly Saudi ports, it has 
used its central geographical location to become an 
important service centre for the region as a whole. The 
end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 brought a revival in 
confidence, enabling Bahrain to reassert this role despite 
increasing competition from other Gulf states. However, 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in august 1990 shattered this 
process and forced the authorities to adopt an assertive 
approach to economic development and diversification. 
Foreign investment rules have been radically liberalised, 
opening Bahrain to fully owned foreign companies for the 
first time. In addition, greater emphasis is being placed 
on the development of small to medium sized industrial 
ventures. The Bahrain Development Bank (BDB) was 
established in 1991 to provide long term loans and venture 
capital to attract investors. 
One project which has had a profound impact on the 
economic and political life of Bahrain is the causeway to 
Saudi Arabia, which was opened in December 1986. Although 
Bahraini merchants may have lost out as locals flock to 
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Saudi Arabia to buy cheaper food and consumer goods, 
local industries have benefited substantially from export 
opportunities in Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states and 
the advantages of cheaper transport for imported raw 
materials. The influx of Saudi visitors, especially at 
weekends, has given a fillip to restaurant and hotel trade 
and has encouraged increased investment in the tourism 
sector. During the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, Bahrain benefited 
somewhat from supplying the US led forces stationed across 
the causeway at the Saudi airbase at Dhahran®. 
From power generation to paper towels, Bahrain's 
efforts to attract private-sector investment are starting 
to bear fruits. New incentives and straight forward 
official procedures are prompting investors to look 
favourably at Bahrain as a location from which to target 
the GCC markets, especially Saudi Arabia- Two joint 
ventures are moving fast to set up a tissue paper mill and 
pipeline systems plant. At the sametime, the progress of 
plans to build a private power plant show the government 
is serious about bringing private financing to the public 
utilities . 
6. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, Bahrain 
and Qatar, 1992-93, London, U.K., pp.8-9. 
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The tissue paper mill was initially planned for 
Jubail, Saudi Arabia. Kimberly-Clark and its joint venture 
partner, Olayan of Saudi Arabia, which will build the $33 
million mill, then transferred to Bahrain. 
Also targeting Saudi Arabia is a project planned 
by Shaw Industries of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to make 
prefabricated pipeline systems with a local partner, 
Abdullah Ahmed Nass Industrial Services (AA Nass). Shaw 
mainly sells in the US, where it says it holds 45% of the 
market, producing in the GCC will reduce transport and 
tariff costs. 
Industrialization is the central plank of the 
government's plans to diversify the economy. Private funds 
will help finance the infrastructure development badly 
needed to enable the process to continue.Aluminium Bahrain 
(Alba), which already sells some of its generating 
overcapacity in emergencies, wants to sell 250 MW on a 
regular basis; its link to the national grid will be ready 
in a short time. An additional power station, planned by the 
government for some time, is now in the hands of the 
private sector: British Gas has to prepare a technical and 
financial plan. With its 500 MW of capacity and associated 
desalination plant, this will be one of the largest 
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private power pro3ects in the Gulf. British Gas has 
already approached banks for project finance and will be 
looking for a local joint-venture partner. The power plant 
is scheduled to be operational in 1996 and will supply 
Bahrain with sufficient power for another decade. 
Free Zonet 
Private financing may play a role in other 
infrastructure development. The government is considering 
a private financing arrangement to build a port and free 
zone at Hidd. The estimated $70 million - $100 million 
investment will provide a multi-purpose terminal and 
container port with capacity for 400,000 containers a 
year, twice the size of Mina Sulman harbour. Attached to 
the port will be an industrial free zone and future plans 
envisage expanding the free zone and port and building a 
causeway from Hidd to Sitra. The port is mainly intended 
to meet the growth in cargo destined for Bahrain, after 
earlier plans to develop it for transhipment were revised. 
The project, on the back burner for several years, is now 
apparently making progress. 
Bahrain airport has begun establishing itself as a 
regional hub, to counter the loss of long-haul customers 
in the late 1980s. In its newsletter it boasts the status 
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of "number one air to air transhipment hub". An expansion 
of the airport is expected to be complete soon, enabling 
it to handle 10 million passengers a year. More than 50 
airlines use the airport and their number is growing. 
The second Manama to Muharraq causeway, which will 
handle the expected growth in the volume of traffic to and 
from the airport is the island's largest construction 
project. The contract for the last remaining construction 
package, for the marine and interchange bridges was signed 
with Saudi Archirodon in April 1993. 
The government hopes the airport expansion will 
also help the tourism industry, already a focus for 
private-sector investment. Expatriates and tourists are 
still waiting for a golf course, which a joint venture has 
now pledged to build. The Indian Tatia Skyline and Health 
Farms (TSHF) and the local Alkhalidia group are planning a 
health farm, theme park, golf club and yoga centre 
modelled on a similar TSHF establishment in South India. 
This project geared towards wealthy tourists, is to be 
financed by life membership fees of $25,000. The French 
hotel chain Le Meridien is working on a more conventional 
hotel. The 300 bed hotel will include a beach and sports 
facilities, specifically aimed at attracting tourists. 
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Creating employment opportunities is a key factor 
in the development of the private sector. The government's 
strategy is to offer incentives to companies which employ 
a certain percentage of nationals as part of their labour 
force. The tissue paper mill and pipeline systems projects 
will make use of this policy to help finance their 
investment. 
Plans to make Bahrain an international financial 
services centre, intended as a diversification, have not 
been as successful as first hoped, however, the slimmed-
down offshore banking sector is showing signs of better 
health after the decline in 1980s and the sftock of the 
Gulf war. The offshore banks still present now operate in 
a more profitable environment and are taking advantage of 
the increased confidence in the region. Arab Banking 
Corporation and Gulf International Bank, the two largest 
offshore units, reported a 76% and 37% net profit 
increase, respectively for 1992. 
The Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA - central bank) is 
maintaining its reputation as one of the region's most 
capable supervisors by introducing sound reporting 
standards for the banks. The Bahrain stock enchange is 
planning to change its rules and open up trading. Plans 
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under consideration include allowing foreign investment 
in offshore banks and listing foreign companies-
Bahrain's most important non-oil sector, the 
aluminium industry has been doing well, especially 
compared with other aluminium exporters. Although prices 
slumped as Russian aluminium flooded the market over the 
past two years and many smelters around the world were 
forced to close down. Alba completed its capacity 
increase and its marketing company made a profit in 1992. 
Downstream aluminium work is growing, as Bahrain 
Aluminium Extrusion Company (Balexco) is buying a new 
extrusion press and has plans for a further one. 
Balexco is one of the few instances where 
privatization, a declared aim of the government is going 
ahead: the state is to halve its shareholding to 40% and 
eventually total privatization - Gulf Air, the regional 
airline Bahrain shares with Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Oman, is 
also marked for privatization. The idea first emerged in 
1984 but was subsequently abandoned because of the 
economic slump in the Gulf. The plan has now been revived 
and the shareholders want to sell 49%^. 
7. Blum, Charlotte, "Bahrain's Promise for Investors", 
MEED, Vol. 37, No. 33, 20 August, 1993, pp. 2-3. 
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Though there has been little privatization so far, 
private sector investment has come in Bahrain and 
shall cater to employment opportunities for nationals. 
The efficiency in government clearances and the 
incentives associated with government's employment 
policy is convincing the companies to use Bahrain as a 
place to target the Saudi market. 
For the period 1970-1988, the petroleum export 
revenues have accounted for 81.1% of the total export 
revenues (see Table 1.4 in chapter 1). This is 
relatively low as compared to other GCC countries. 
Moreover a sizeable percentage of the petroleum export 
revenues is that of refined petroleum. For the period 
1984-1993, the average percentage contribution of 
mining and quarrying sector to the GDP is 19.6% and 
ranks third. Here notably the contribution of this 
sector does not rank first. Moreover mining in case of 
Bahrain to a great size includes the mining of 
minerals other than the extraction of oil. 
The largest contributor to the GDP are financial 
institutions and insurance. Their average percentage 
contribution to the GDP for the period 1984-1993 is 
20.6%. 
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Producers of government services rank second as 
regards contribution to the GDP. This sector's average 
percentage contribution for the period 
1984-1993 is 20.4%. Here too for Bahrain also a strong 
dominance of the services sector over the economy is 
depicted. 
Manufacturing contributes 14.8% to the GDP for the 
period 1984-1993 and ranks fourth. The least contribution 
to GDP comes from agriculture sector, it is merely 1.1% 
for the period 1984-1993. 
Certainly Bahrain's economy exhibits itself as a 
more diversified economy than the economy of other GCC 
countries. 
QATAR: 
Conscious of Qatari society's vulnerability to the 
forces at work since 1945, the government has sought to 
encourage economic and social development without 
destroying the roots of a people with a proud bedouin 
heritage in which religion plays a central role. 
The oil price booms of the mid and late 1970s 
helped to boost living standards considerably and laid the 
foundations for independent statehood. However, concern 
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Table 4.11 
Average Percentage Contribution of Different Sectors of 
Bahrain to GDP (1984-1993) 
Sectors Percentage 
contribution 
Ranks 
Financial institutions & insurance 20.6 1 
Producers of government services 20.4 2 
Mining & quarrying 19.6 3 
Manufacturing 14.8 4 
Less: imputed bank service 
charges 13.5 5 
Transport, storage & 
communication 11.1 6 
Wholesale & retail trade, 
restaurants & hotels 10.3 7 
Construction 7.0 8 
Community, social & 
personal services 4.8 9 
Electricity, gas & water 3.3 10 
Import duties 2.8 11 
Agriculture, forestry & hunting 1.1 12 
Source: Computed on the basis of computations made in 
Table 4.10. 
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about the impact of too rapid growth prompted the 
government to introduce economic change at a pace the 
country could handle. The biggest worry was that heavy 
investment in infrastructure would draw in huge numbers of 
Arab, Iranian and Indian v/orkers. Development policy has 
sought to avoid creating an expatriate flood, but Qataris 
are still in a minority. 
Transformation since independence is impressive. 
According to the UN, the average Qatari now has a life 
expectancy of 66 years and infant mortality has fallen to 
little more than 50 a thousand - although both figures 
have room for improvement. The national education 
programme has cut illiteracy rates to less than 33% - one 
of the lowest in the Aab world. Doha, the capital has been 
turned into a pleasant modern city. The bay has been 
extended into a crescent dominated by the pyramid shaped 
Doha Sheraton owned by the government. A series of public 
buildings substantial without being imposing provide a 
backdrop to the corniche road leading to the old town. 
Such measures are aimed at laying the foundations 
for the next phase of development, signalled by the end of 
hostilities in the Gulf. Proud of its independence, yet 
aware that it is too small to pursue an entirely 
autonomous economic strategy. Qatar is looking to the GCC to 
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provide the proper context for the challenges ahead. It is 
a shareholder in Gulf Air, which it owns with Bahrain, Abu 
Dhabi and Oman. Other Gulf institutions in which it has an 
interest include Gulf International Bank (GIB ) and Gulf 
Aluminium Rolling Mill Company (Garmco) in Bahrain and 
g 
Gulf Investment Corporation (GIC) in Kuwait . 
The GCC aims to create a new development 
environment in the peninsula, one that offers Qatar the 
chance to make further economic progress by giving access 
to a market of about 15 million people with similar 
historical and cultural backgrounds. At the same time, it 
will be free to maintain its identity and special 
attractions it offers business and political partners in 
the Gulf and elsewhere. 
For the period 1970-1992, the petroleum export 
revenues have accounted for 95.3% of the total export 
revenues (see Table 1.5 in chapter 1). This shows the 
heavy dependence of Qatari economy on the oil sector. Due 
to oil sector being the lead sector repercussions of the 
oil price crash of 1986 were seriously felt when petroleum 
export revenues declined by 48.4% and total export 
revenues by 45.1%. Still during these gloomy days of oil 
market the contribution of petroleum export revenues to 
total export revenues was 93%. From 1986 onwards the 
8. MEED, Qatar Special Report, Vol. 32, No. 39, 30 
September 1988, p. 25. 
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contribution of petroleum export revenues to total 
export revenues has relatively declined. This suggests 
that there is some improvement in non-oil exports. 
The mining and quarrying which mainly constitutes 
oil extraction, its average percentage contribution for 
the period 1984-1993 was 34,1% and it ranked first as 
regards the contribution of various sectors to GDP. During 
1988 when the oil price declined by 21.6% the contribution 
of this sector to GDP fell from 29.6% to 25.4%. In 1989 
the oil price rose by 18.7% and mining's contribution to 
GDP also rose to 30%. In 1990 the oil price rose by 31.1% 
and the contribution to GDP to 38%. In 1991 the oil price 
declined by 15.6% and so did the contribution of this 
sector decline to 32.5%. In 1992 the oil price once again 
rose by 3.1% and the mining's contribution to GDP also 
rose to 35.8% (see Tables 4.13 & 4.15). This clearly shows 
that the contribution of oil sector to the GDP is directly 
proportional to the movement in oil prices. 
The average percentage contribution of the 
producers of government services to GDP over the period 
1992-1993 is 27.6% and ranks second. 
The contribution of manufacturing sector is 11.2% 
and ranks third. 
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Real estate and business services and contruction 
are close to each other ranking sixth and seventh 
respectively with their contribution being 5% and 4.7% 
respectively. Since the related activities of construction 
and real estate are very close to each other, it is 
suggested that their is a sizeable amount of construction 
activity in the country. 
As shown in the case of other GCC economies here 
also in the case of Qatar services sector has a strong 
presence in the economy. 
Agriculture has a insignificant contribution to 
the GDP of 0.9% and the least contribution of 0.6% comes 
from import duties. 
United Arab Emirates: 
In UAE more than 2 million barrels a day (b/d) of 
oil flows from the oil wells but the UAE's non-oil sectors 
are growing much faster. In its bid to be the prime 
regional location for both business and pleasure, the UAE 
is aware that an attractive environment has to be 
protected as well as exploited. 
The bullish business conditions of the recent 
past have created the perfect chance to speed up plans to 
diversify and develop the economy away from its oil 
cn CTl 
(N o\ <T\ 
<J\ 
0 01 
00 
00 
00 Ol 
00 <n 
00 CT* 
m 
00 
00 
tn <T, o o to 
• 1 • • • 00 in o rH t-- in o (N O r-j IN n CN cn ro rH 
o o O o O 
• • * • • o CTl [— cn to o t-H tN CM ro rH n i-H 
o O O O O 
* • • • • 00 <J\ o> n m n O (SI tN rH n o 
CO fO rH 
o o o o o 
o •H rH o r-H 00 in rH tN i-H r-4 O n rH rH 
O O o O O 
'a- rn CTi CN o ro •a" tN r-t fn CO <J\ r- n 
o o o o o 
04 fH 00 m o n cn n to ro tN tn r-t ro o in rn rH 
o o O o o 
r- o fN n m to o to cn tN tX) .H n o^  m rM 
o o o o o 
r^  tn n ^ m CTl to m rvl n r- n o m cH I-H 
o o O o O 
n tn o r-( cn 
iH CTi CTl rH <N tn rH n 1-1 rH 
O o o O o 
• ) , ( • o 0\ in rH O n CN to rH tN m 00 rH 
rH rH rH 
rH 
u) <U •H 
U1 3 V c w I 
cn C •H 4J C 3 x: 
>1 u 4J U) 0) ^ o 
OJ u 3 4J •-H 3 U •H U Cr> < 
c n 
c •H >1 U n 10 3 cr 
c n 
c •H C 
s 
c n 
c -H 
D ^ U « u-t 3 C o s 
Vl (U •u § 
in 
01 
>1 •p •H u •H 
O (U r-l a 
rH o o cn o O CTl O 
• • • • • * • 
CM tn 1 o O 00 in cn rH CM 00 cn CTv cn cn m 00 cn r~-rH m o to 
CM 
f-l O o o o O o o 
• • 1 • • • • 
CN o 1 to cn tn 'J- to 00 o <n tn m 00 00 rH tn tn r--rH CO o to 
CM rH O o O o o o o 
• • • • • • • I- cn tn 1 n CM -a* cn to 00 t^  tn CM to r- CO CM to cn to 
rH CM r^  to 
rH rH o o o o o O o 
• • • • • ( • o tn n 1 rH cn r- rH 00 00 tn tn CM CM tn to in CM to to rH CM cn to 
rH rH O o O o O o o 
• • • • • > • 00 cn in 1 CN rH •ST 00 
rH to m CN r^  to to to CM tn tn oo rH CM to to 
rH rH o o O O o o o 
• • • • • • • 00 to 1 tn o CM rH n m m m T OO CM cn to CN CM m CM cn 
rH tN •cr f-
rH rH 
O o o o o o o 
cn 00 OO 1 T m r^  in rH o oo rH m in tn tn cn CM t/i o rr r-H rH cn to 
rH rH O o o O o o o 
cn o (N 1 CO 00 rH rH m rH 
rH T cn tN tn o o 
rH rH CN to rH 
o o o o O o o o 
• • * • • • ( to o to tn rH •"J* 00 00 in r- (N O CO cn 'I' 
rH to CM CN tn 
rH rH to in 
rH 
o o o o O o o o 
• • • * • 1 . • to o tn •"J- tN m m cn o 00 CM m tN CN CO tn t-- rH CM tn tn rH rH rH 00 to M 
0) •a m M in 
c 
o •H 4J O ^ 
tn c o u 
f-i flj 
•H JJ 
<c o -u £ lU 
w iJ (U c iH (0 (0 n 
i n 3 (U (0 '-I 4J 0 W £ o S M 
c 0 •H 4J s •H c 
1 o 
<u 
c n nJ u 
o 
4J M 
o a 
i n c 10 M H 
(U u 
c (0 l-l 3 
i n 
c 
i n 
c 
o -H +J 3 4J •H •p 
i n c 
m 
o c 10 c 
Cl4 
t n (U o •H > 
tu U} 
i n 
i n Q) c -H 
i n 3 ja 
tu 4J 
to •u to tu 
to 0} OS 
in OJ u •H > 
tu 
tn 
(0 c o in M tu a 
u o tn 
>1 
•H C 
i e o u 
01 tu cn M lO 
£ O 
tu o > 
M tu tn 
X c (0 JH 
Tl tu 4J 3 a 
E •H 
in in o J 
tn 
•H U V m 3 •a c 
<0 
o 
Eh 
in <u u •H 
> l-l tu tn 
•M c tu B C 
Vj tu > o CP 
<*-( o 
in u tu o 3 Tl 0 u c. 1 X3 
>4-1 o M a 
tin 'a 0) .-I J^ O 10 x: > tu •H in ^ 2 a o £ 
in u w tu <u o U 3 -H -a > 0 M tu a, tn 1 u 
1 6 2 o <n o cn 
tN tn to rH cn rH vT to cn rH tn >!T oo 00 ' 1 Ol 
o o o o 
<N to to CM rH o rH CM tn to CM OO r^  r-CM CM 
o o O o 
to tn tn to 00 to cn in CM CM 00 rH o in cn CM tM 1 rH o o o o •cr 
• * • • tn 00 to to CM t to T cn Q< CM to rH a to to tN CM * 
c O O o o to 
• • •o cn rH in to )H in rH 0 CM rH to tn tn CM CM * c o o o O to 
• • • e cn to cn cn e m cn r- < CM 00 rH tn 
rH rH * 
CM CM o 3 o O O O 1/5 
• • • in m tn O tn M rH Ol cn rg CN to rH OO x: cn CTl -u 
rH rH c: o O o o o tu 
• • • u OO m o m M <n to <n cn 3 rH CM rH cn o 00 CO 
rH rH 
o O r-> o r 1 
• • Ol r-- cn cn 00 tn 00 to CM cn rH 
rH CN rH n 1 
CM r-j cn 
CM CM CO cn o O o o -H 
to O 00 00 tn rH o C 
rH oo rH o 0 rr m •H tN CM O tu in K tu 3 < 
rH 2 10 U > w ti3 in u (U tu x: in in n to rH x: "M 
O 4J o 0 
£ 3 tu O 3 in x: Q. o 3 •p « 
O •H C u x: •H 4J tn 
UH •u •U XI 
o o O < 3 a in • a n rH tu o o to 
o >H iH O a a •rH 
> •U o D tn 
tu •H in tn •H •H in 4J (U tu 4J in -H •rH in to V tu 4J tu • u 
•H e 3 3 E w 
4J O "O •a 0 in n V 
tu •U 4J tu 
E in u IH in 0 
O tn 0 O in M 
Q O cu a o 3 
1 u B e ij 0 
• o O -H M o w 
163 
n Ol cn r-l I t 
OO CTI 
U (U u •H 
4J g 
M M 
3 O 
•P m 
U) (U 3 r-l <0 > 
to u <u u 3 Tl O M 04 
••H 0) 
Es 
<s, 
•H c 
o c o o M 
<t-l o 
-o c 
•H 
^ 
M m 
•p A) o 
iw O 
u 3 -o 
0 
cu 
u •H 4J U 1 
m (0 o M O 
n ci 
CM 
CT> cn 
o <T1 a\ 
<Ti 
00 CTl 
00 
00 
00 o^  
<x> 
00 CTi 
in 
00 Ol 
00 cri 
CTl in m r-l rsi 
• • • • O (N iH Tf n 
0^  00 in rH n 
• • • • 
O in rH rH ro iH 
(Ti in n rH 
• • • • • O (N n rH •>3> n r-l 
o 00 in (N 
• • • • • o CO <N rH •V n rH 
o f-H •"J* rH 
* • • ( • o o rH n rH 
o T CN VO 
• • • • • in •a* rH 'J" 
(N rH 
l-l in CO o 
• * • < * 
<H o rH m <N rH 
cs n U> 
• • • • • r-i cn CTl rH in CN 
<J\ 00 <71 00 00 
o (N o in •"J-
00 ro n 
o in o m 
n o 
VD n VD 
o 
m 
m in in 
in IN o^  
00 00 ro 
VD CM o rH 
o CTi rH 
lO <N o rH 
OO 00 
• (M ro ro rH (N 
00 00 CNl 03 • t 
• (N r^ rH CN 
rH VD lO 
• • * ( 
rH <N r-H lO 
rsi 
CTl n kO 00 
o (N 
CN 
OO 
CI 
o 
KO m 
VO fN 
o 
o 
o 
<N <T1 CN 00 CN 
rn 
CN vo n n 
00 
CN m vo CN n 
O n 00 m in lO (N n 
CN o o 
m CN CO 
-a- CO rH Ol 
m o CN <N r- in CN 
o o> 
iH 
00 
(N 
r- 00 
o 
o 
CM 
00 
o 
t-
co 
<N 
• t CJ> o CTl 
CN 
a\ o 
rr in o o> 
CI uj 
CT> o 
a\ O CTl 
cn 
<Tl O 
CN r--
CTl o CTl 
in 
o 
m 
cr> o CTl 
10 O (U •H o t»H c <u •rH in in 0 o > a) Q) •P 01 <4H •H c u n O •rl •o 0 cr> -P <0 tn ® tH •H •(H rH c M (U in 10 > 0 o •p in •H o 3 o x: M VI x: 3 •H •U •rH 01 •H rH o (U a 0) 0 'n c c c > 10 in in x: re 3 3 -H u c (1) c 3 •p XI 
£ e 0) 0 o •P 0 O •rl (U E o3 in in •H C c in x; 0 •0 01 •o o VI > 0) -a x: •p (B CJ in U) 4) M e Q) rH UH •p la U c cn a 0) C •P o o o U s •P U) oB o 0) to M (0 .c 3 c 4J rH •H c Ofl 0) > <u in •o 0 (0 oB rH aj <u 4J •H > •H in <u O <U C •rl CP 3 in rH c o H 3 o Vl 'O U •r| in 10 0 to -P 3 (0 10 in a o •H a OJ 0 >1 (0 •P £ u •H XI •H XI <u £ > •p IM VH w lU 0 4J 0 •r( UH UH M V 3 U H oe jj in 03 0 T! 0 0 o 0) •H in in U) * (0 c - c in c in 4) -p •p in 4J UJ 0) n OJ o 3 •rl 0 oo in •rl 0) 4J in in in in -H •M o •H u cr -P •H iJ - -p * 3 3 u »H in o (U 4J 4J u 3 3 •rH 4J 0) C •p r-H <0 a, T3 01 (1) 0) •H E 3 3 •U 4J •s •P 0 U rH t3 u •p p g c u O 0 •P O T3 TJ Ul rH O •r^  3 <0 VJ o •rH in •rH •H M 3 3 "H in •D • • 3 3 tj> <0 (H tH m 3 a, u <u C •o -O > (U 4J •P <u TJ O c IM JJ •P dJ (0 in c 3 • • rH 0 O IH E tn u 0 C •H -H 3 0 in rH iJ c fO rH E in 10 U vi a O in o o u M U c C 0 C 0 U1 10 c <0 E X 4J Cu OJ M a o a a o 1 cn -H nj rH O £ o H OJ 0 0 0 1 1 1 ^ e e 0 fO < s £ U U S u E- X U J 12 o •a O -H M (n 
164 
Table 4.11 
Average Percentage Contribution of Different Sectors of 
Qatar to GDP (1984-1993) 
Sectors Percentage 
contribution 
Ranks 
Mining & quarrying 34.1 1 
Producers of government services 27.6 2 
Manufacturing 11.2 3 
Financial institutions & 
insurance 9.3 4 
Wholesale & retail trade, 
restaurants & hotels 6.1 5 
Real estate & business services 5.0 6 
Construction 4.7 7 
Transport, storage & 
communication 2.6 8 
Less: imputed bank service 
charges 2.5 9 
Domestic services of households 1.7 10 
Electricity, gas & water 1.3 11 
Community, social & personal 
services 1.1 12 
Agriculture, forestry & hunting 0.9 13 
Import duties 0.6 14 
Source: Computed on the basis of computations made in 
Table 4.13. 
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Table 4.15 
Crude Oil Prices in Qatar (1970-1992) 
(US Dollars per barrel) 
Year Price of Dukhan % Change in Prices 
1970 - -
1971 2.38 -
1972 2.59 +8.8 
1973 3.02 +16.6 
1974 11.17 +269.8 
1975 11.85 + 6.0 
1976 - -
1977 13.19 -
1978 - -
1979 17.84 -
1980 31 .42 + 76.1 
1981 35.65 + 13.4 
1982 34.49 -3.2 
1983 29.49 -14.4 
1984 - -
1985 28.10 -
1986 - -
1987 17.40 -
1988 13.63 -21.6 
1989 16.18 + 18.7 
19 90 21.22 +31.1 
1991 17.89 -15.6 
1992 18.45 +3.1 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1987 & 1992, OPEC, Vienna, 
Austria, pp.126.& 118. 
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dependency. Funds have flowed into new infrastructure 
projects providing power, water, roads and public 
amenities. When the growth in activity hit a post-Kuwait 
crisis peak in 1992-93, real estate, construction, 
transport and communications were the fastest moving 
sectors of the economy. The new tower blocks shooting up 
in Abu Dhabi city and the commercial bustle in the Dubai 
metropolitan area testify to the burst of investment 
enthusiasm. Analysts feel that the construction boom has 
another 1-1^ 5 year to run on the basis of projects already 
approved or initiated. Softer oil prices are expected to 
constrain future spending commitments but there is no sign 
that current spending is being affected. 
The non-oil economy is just over 60% of gross 
domestic product but oil and gas are the principal sources 
of revenue for Abu Dhabi and Dubai. As the two wealthiest 
emirates, their contributions pay for the federal budget 
and subsidise the other five emirates. With oil reserves of 
around 100,000 million barrels, Abu Dhabi has a cushion 
for at least another 100 years at current rates of 
extraction. If Abu Dhabi with an annual budget larger than 
that of the entire UAE, can look to the future with 
equanimity, the same cannot be said of its federal 
partners. There are huge contrasts in wealth within the 
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federation. In 1992, per capita GDP in Abu Dhabi was more 
than $ 32,000; in Ajman it was $6,311, according to a US 
government report. The average for the UAE was nearly 
$21,000. Beneath the federal umbrella each emirate retains 
authority over economic strategy and their prospects vary 
enormously. 
After a lean period in the 1980s when it wrestled 
with debt problems, Sharjah is set to earn fresh income 
from the development of Kahaif gas deposits. Sharjah also 
has a substantial light industrial sector based on Asian 
labour, two busy ports and an airport. It is also 
benefiting from the thriving activity in neighbouring 
Dubai. The northern emirates, with more traditional 
economies based on subsistence farming and fishing, rely 
heavily on federal outlays. Fujairah is building up a 
moderate revenue stream from port and airport fees and a 
fledgling tourist industry. 
Dubai is making the most determined efforts to 
develop an alternative economic base. The strategic 
investment began almost as soon as oil was first exported 
in 1969. Port Rashid opened one year later and quickly 
established itself as the leading Gulf transhipment 
centre. When Port Rashid and Jebel Ali were combined into 
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the Dubai Ports Authority in 1991, Dubai ranked among the 
top 15 ports worldwide for container throughput. In 1985, 
the free zone opened at Jebel Ali; it has since attracted 
625 companies, many of them household names worldwide. The 
local air carrier Emirates has broken records and won 
service awards almost every year since its launch in the 
mid-1980s. Dubai is now projecting itself powerfully as 
the business gateway to the Gulf. Good communications, 
available skills and quality facilities have created an 
efficient business environment. Dubai also provides a 
liberal cosmopolitan social climate which is in stark 
contrast to the restrictive atmosphere in neighbouring 
states. Whether it is the dhow-based trade with Iran, the 
new consumer electronics trade with the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), now estimated to be worth about 
$1,000 million a year, or the hectic schedule of 
international conferences and exhibitions, Dubai hums with 
a sense of purpose. Among the official delegations 
flocking to inspect Jebel Ali are many who have no 
intention of investing. They simply want to learn how a 
successful free zone works so they can copy it. 
Behind the increasing glossy surface in Dubai, 
there are questions about the substance- Costs are rising 
steadily, threatening the steady influx of companies that 
open regional offices or free 2one facilities. To replace 
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falling oil revenues, a tax structure will have to be 
9 devised soon which may erode the emirates attractions . 
For the time being, confidence abounds. Dubai's 
strategy looks smart and it has generated a whirlwind of 
activity. 
For the period 1970-1992, the petroleum export 
revenues constituted 81.3% of the total export revenues 
(see table 1.6 in chapter 1). This shows the quantum of 
dependence of UAE economy on the oil sector. The oil price 
crash of 1986 had its mark on the economy of UAE when the 
oil export revenues declined by 36.3% and the total export 
revenues declined by 31.3%. Even during this period the 
contribution of petroleum export revenues to total export 
revenues was 74.1%. From 1986 onwards the contribution of 
petroleum export revenues to total export revenues has 
been lower meaning thereby that the contribution of 
non-oil sector is increasing. 
The mining and quarrying sector which mainly 
ecncompasses oil extraction, its average percentage 
contribution for the period 1984-1993 was 40.6% and ranked 
first as regards the contribution of various sectors to 
9. MEED, UAE Special Report, Vol. 38, No. 18, 6 May 
1994, pp. 33-34
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the GDP. The relationship between the oil prices and its 
contribution to the GDP is erratic for the period 
1988-1992 (see table 4.17 & table 4.19). 
The average percentge contribution of producers 
goods and services to the GDP over the period 1984-1993 is 
11.6% and ranks second. 
The contribution of construction and real estate 
and business services rank quite closely to each other i.e. 
fourth and sixth respectively. Their average percentage 
contribution over the period 1984-1993 is 9.3% and 5.8% 
respectively. 
The average percentage contribution of 
manufacturing over the period 1984-1993 is 8.6% and 
ranks fifth. 
The least contribution of -0.09% is from the 
electricity, gas and water. It is negative because it is 
subsidised. 
As in the case of other G CC countries, very 
strong contributor to the GDP here also is the services 
sector. 
OMAN : 
Oil revenues have enabled Oman to erect a modern 
infrastructure of roads, ports, airports, schools and 
hospitals, television and telecommunications, power and 
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Table 4.11 
Average Percentage Contribution of Different Sectors of 
UAE to GDP (1984-1993) 
Sectors Percentage 
contribution 
Ranks 
Mining & quarrying 40.6 1 
Producers of government services 11.6 2 
Wholesale & retail trade, 
restaurants & hotels 10.2 3 
Construction 9.3 4 
Manufacturing 8.6 5 
Real estate & business services 5.8 6 
Transport, storage & 
ccMtimuni cation 5.1 7 
Financial institutions & 
insurance 5.1 7 
Community, social & personal 
services 2.0 9 
Less: imputed bank service 
charges 1.6 10 
Agriculture, forestry & hunting 1.6 10 
Domestic services to households 0.3 12 
Import duties 0.2 13 
Electricity, gas & water -0.09 14 
Source: Computed on the basis of computations made in 
Table 4.17. 
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Table 4.11 
Crude Oil Prices in UAE (1970-1992) 
(US Dollars per barrel) 
Year Price of Dubai Fateh % Change in Prices 
1970 - -
1971 2.23 -
1972 2.42 +8.5 
1973 2.99 +23.5 
1974 11.59 +287.6 
1975 12.31 +6.2 
1976 - -
1977 13.66 -
1978 - -
1979 17.51 -
1980 30.03 + 71.5 
1981 35.93 +19.6 
1982 - -
1983 28.86 -
1984 - -
1985 27.86 -
1986 - -
1987 16.92 -
1988 13.18 -22.1 
1989 15.64 +18.6 
1990 20.38 +30.3 
1991 16.62 -18.4 
1992 17.16 +3.2 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin,1987 & 1992, OPEC, Vienna, 
Austria, pp. 128-30 & 116. 
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water plants, with inpressive speed. A society steeped in poverty 
in 1970 noil? boasts a per capita income level of about $6,480. 
Primary education is almost universal and figures for life 
expectancy and infant mortality have improved 
dramatically. Progress poses its own problems and it is 
these the government is anxious to address. Young parents 
who contribute to a population growth rate of 3.8% are 
encouraged to reduce and space their births; development 
funds are steered to rural acreas to avert migration to 
the towns; water conservation is a concern. 
It is Oman's economic prospects, however, that 
attract most international attention. The growing burden 
of recurrent spending has squeezed capital outlays and 
pushed the budget into deficit every year since 1988. This 
has obliged Oman to borrow internationally through a 
series of syndicated loans and domestically through the 
issue of development bonds. Attractively priced, both 
instruments sell well. Oman has also dipped into reserves 
to fund its objectives. Higher than expected oil prices 
might provide some relief, but there will be no escape 
from the deficit trend without a change of emphasis. In 
1993 Oman invited the World Bank to assess its economic 
performance and table recommendations for achieving 
sustainable growth, industrial diversification and 
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enhanced efficiency. A robust report followed, suggesting 
that Oman was spending too much and saving too little. It 
likened Oman's oil and gas wealth to a large inheritance 
which could leave the country poorer at some point in the 
future if not enough is saved and invested now. The 
decisions following from this report shall be embodied in 
the five year plan which will aim at a much reduced role 
for the state. If the last plan was intended to prepare a 
patform for private sector initiatives, its successor will 
give private enterprise, both domestic and foreign, full 
rein. 
The ministry wants to see more investment in 
export-oriented industry and is working on a 25 year 
strategy. Plans for the export of liquified natural gas 
(LNG) to the Far East, gas to India, a petrochemical 
complex and a urea and ammonia plant are just the first 
wave. In anticipation the legal and financial 
infrastructure is being overhauled to ease the advance of 
these huge ventures. Foreign investors can own 65% of a 
local company, or upto 100% in special circumstances ; 
modest corporate taxes are being imposed, but tax holidays 
of 10 years are available for new schemes; the Muscat 
Securities Market (MSM) is. being promoted to local and 
international investors. The private sector is already 
m 
stepping into the provision of electricity and is being 
invited to invest in new power stations and waste water 
projects. Desalination plants and toll roads could soon 
follow. The blueprints for private utilities is the 90 MW 
Manah project which brought together private and 
international investors, raised money on the Muscat 
Securities Market and is tapping export credit facilities. 
The power station will be ready in two years' time and 
will be privately operated for 20 years before it is 
returned to the state. Following the success of the Manah 
scheme the authorities have rushed out other, more complex 
proposals with ambitious plans which have had to be 
extended to allow a proper appraisal. 
The range of schemes vying for attention is broad. 
From infrastructure to industry, toll roads to tourism 
there will be no shortage of investment opportunities in 
the next few years. Indeed they are so numerous that one 
project could crowd out another by soaking up scarce 
financial resources. It would depend upon what debt/equity 
structure the firms come up with. If the leading 
infrastructure schemes and the Oman LNG project all come 
to fruition Oman may have a financing requirement for 
about $3,000 million over the next three years according 
to a foreign banker. Some of the attractions for foreign 
investors are Oman's record of financial prudence, 
its unquestioned commitment to capitalism, and its 
political stability. The economics of all the new 
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ventures still has to be explored, but local investors are 
among their keenest advocates. The 54 year old sultan has 
been the dominant figure in Oman's development, assuming a 
strong leadership role in the state - building process of 
the past 25 years. But he has cultivated traditional 
contacts to ensure consensus and endeavoured to remain 
accessible to Oman's 1.5 million nationals. He tours the 
country regularly. But modernization is changing the 
country and the system is adopting accordingly. In 1991 a 
ma3lis al-shura (consultative council) was established, 
drawing its members from the sultanate's 59 wilayats. It 
has since expanded to 80 members, who are selected by the 
sultan from a list compiled by local elders, and even has 
two women members. The majlis can summon members to 
explain policies and some of their discussions are 
televised. In his address to the majlis in December 1994, 
Sultan Qaboos described it as a partner with government^®. 
Oman has cordial relations with its neighbours and 
can devote time and attention to domestic development 
issues. These are likely to become even more pressing 
during the years to come. More than 50% of the population 
was under 15 years old at the time of the 1993 census and 
10. MEED Oman Special Report, Vol. 39, No. 18, 5 May 
1995, pp. 7-10. 
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young Omanis have higher expectations which will become 
harder to satisfy. Without a shock surge in oil prices 
population growth will outstrip the growth in GDP, in line 
with the trend of recent years, for the foreseeable 
future. The government is aware of the implications and 
hopes that the strategy to be enshrined in the next plan 
will maximise the potential for economic growth. 
For the period 1970-1988, the petroleum export 
revenues have accounted for 98.7% of the total export 
revenues (see Table 1.7 in chapter 7), The oil price crash 
of 1986 had its impact on the economy of Oman when the oil 
export revenues declined by 47.3% and the total export 
revenues declined by 47.1%. Even during this period the 
contribution of petroleum export revenues to total export 
revenues was 98.8%. In 1987 and 1988 the contribution of 
petroleum export revenues to total export revenues has 
been less as compared to the previous years. This suggests 
that there is an endeavour in the economy to diversify. 
The average percentage contribution of the mining 
and quarrying sector (which mainly comprises of oil 
extraction) to the GDP for the period 1984-1993 is 44.3% 
and ranks first with regard to the contribution of various 
sectors to GDP (see Table 4.22). 
180 
The average percentage contribution of producers 
of government services to the GDP over the period 
1984-1993 is 16.5% and ranks second. 
The contribution of real estate and business 
services and construction is close to each other. For the 
period 1984-1993 it is 5.5% and 4.8% respectively and rank 
fourth and fifth respectively. 
For the period 1984-1993/ the contribution of 
manufacturing sector is 3.7% and it ranks sixth. 
The lowest contribution of 0.9% is by the import 
duties. 
As in the case of other GCC countries here also 
there is a strong presence of the services in the GDP. 
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Table 4.11 
Average Percentage Contribution of Different Sectors of 
Oman to GDP (1984-1993) 
Sectors Percentage 
contribution 
Ranks 
Mining & quarrying 44.3 1 
Producers of government services 16.5 2 
Wholesale retail trade, restaurants 
& hotels 12.8 3 
Real estate & business services 5.5 4 
Construction 4.8 5 
Manufacturing 3.7 6 
Agriculture, forestry & hunting 3.3 7 
Transport, storage & 
communication 3.3 7 
Financial institutions & 
insurance 3.3 7 
Less: imputed bank service 
charges 2.2 10 
Electricity, gas & water 1.4 11 
Community, social & personal 
services 1.4 11 
Import duties 0.9 13 
Source: Computed on the basis of computations made in 
Table 4.21. 
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The study demonstrates the importance of oil in 
relation to GCC economies. The task that it has performed 
in the economic development of the economies. The 
sophisticated economic edifice of today has covered a long 
way than what existed before the discovery of oil in these 
simple and primitive economies. 
The study further discerns that whatsoever the 
industrial activity is on account of the oil revenues 
earned. It has been elucidated that oil sector is the lead 
sector and any variations in oil prices and revenues cause 
vibrations on other sectors of the economy. Thus it is but 
necessary to invest oil revenues for diversification of 
the economies, so that the economies do not overwhelmingly 
depend upon a single source of income. 
The GCC economies are very much internationalized 
due to the strategic and vital position that oil enjoys. 
Therefore it needs to go hammer and tongs at the watching 
of international events and trends and take a vigorous 
interest in OPEC and its economic relations with other 
countries. 
The GCC possesses 69.29% of crude oil reserves of 
the Middle East, 59.48% of the OPEC and 45.97% of the 
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world. Similarly GCC possesses 45.43% of the gas reserves 
of the Middle East, 35.54% of the OPEC and 14.31% of the 
world. Also GCC oil production comprises 71.49% of the 
Middle East, 53.84% of the OPEC and 21.97% of the world. 
This data shows that the GCC possesses one of the largest 
reserves of oil. Moreover the GCC is one of the largest 
producer and exporter of crude oil in the world. 
This upstream data shows that there is a 
tremendous scope for down stream operations and the export 
earnings be made value added. This would also diversify 
the economy. It is not to say that there are no downstream 
operations but there is a further scope. 
It has been observed in the previous chapters that 
manufacturing mainly contains downstream oil operations. 
This is not diversification in true sense because the 
extent of such industries depends directly upon the 
position of crude oil. In the stride to diversify the 
economies, these countries may develop various processing 
industries based on imported raw materials of course 
taking into account the comparative costs and cost 
effectiveness. 
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The GCC countries may enter into joint ventures 
with other countries for the establishment of various 
industries in host countries. In this realm the third 
world countries offer a very fertile ground because these 
are usually capital deficient economies whereas GCC 
countries can mobilize and channelize the required funds. 
The GCC countries may enter into financial collaboration 
if not joint ventures because this would find a very 
productive base for the investment of surplus funds. This 
would also help the nationals in learning and adapting to 
various technologies. 
The GCC countries may enter into participative 
agriculture with agriculturally rich countries, it would 
ensure a regular food supply and solve the food security 
problem so vital to GCC countries. 
The GCC countries should take up very vigorously 
date forming and fishing in which it is very rich. 
There is a lot of scope for GCC countries to 
develop tourism in view of their excellent winter climate. 
There is a strong case for the development of such 
industries in which petroleum by-products are used such as 
188 
cosmetic and pharmaceutical industry as most of the 
organic solvents used in pharmaceuticals and different 
waxes formulated in cosmetics are petroleum derivatives. 
In order to have a much wider coordination within 
the GCC countries, the GCC secretriat should formulate its 
own five year plans taking into account the five year 
plans of members countries. This five year plan should be 
a rolling five year plan so as to be able to incorporate 
the annual budget of each of the six countries. This would 
avoid the overlapping of projects and help in the stream 
lining of plans and activities. 
The GCC countries should further concentrate on 
foreign trade as these are basically merchant societies 
and have preeminence in trading from the pre-oil era due 
to their sea - faring traditions. The locational advantage 
and their accessibility to sea route add further to their 
long tradition of trading. 
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